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"Sen minkä ilotta oppii, sen suruttaa unohtaa.” 
What one learns without joy, one forgets without grief (Finnish proverb). 
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Chapter 1 
How do reward and punishment 
influence visual representation? 
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“The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, 
and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, 
with their opposites.” (Aristotle, Rhetoric) 
Pleasure and pain have always been recognized as two fundamental determinants of 
learning, as we can already appreciate in these words by Aristotle. It was many years 
after, though, through Pavlov’s and Thorndike’s studies, that this intuition started to be 
investigated in a more systematic way. We owe to the former the discovery of the link 
between conditioned stimuli and unconditioned response, in the form of classical 
conditioning (Pavlov, 1927), and to the latter the law of effect, which lies at the basis of 
operant conditioning (Thorndike, 1911). While the connection between affect and 
response selection has so far been the object of a long-lasting examination, much more 
recent is the analysis of the parallel relationship between affect and perceptual 
attention. In this respect, only in the last few years it has been demonstrated that 
stimuli associated with reward obtain prioritized visual processing. On the contrary, less 
study has been devoted to the motivational counterpart of this dynamic, punishment. 
In this thesis, I am going to address the issue of how both reward and punishment 
affect visual representation, by the use of a visual search paradigm performed in 
naturalistic scenes. More specifically, I am going to approach these two motivational 
forces by referring to their constituting dimensions, namely valence and salience. In 
fact, while being positioned in oppositely valenced space, these two outcomes share 
the burden of signaling stimuli with strong behavioral importance, coding therefore for 
motivational salience. After reviewing the main existing literature in this field (Chapter 
1), I will describe a series of studies which examine how reward and punishment 
impact visual attention through the analysis of behavioral measures (Chapter 2) and 
fMRI activation (Chapter 3 and 4). The main idea resulting from these studies is that, in 
spite of what a rational approach to the problem would suggest, automatic visual 
attention does not process these two outcomes according to a salience, but rather 
through a valence pattern. 
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Behavioral effects of reward and punishment on visual 
attention 
 
Given the limited amount of resources of our nervous system, sensory stimuli need to 
compete in order to undergo further processing and to reach representation. According 
to the biased competition model, attention is the mechanism through which this 
conflict is resolved in favour of one stimulus over the others (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). A series of factors modulate this process: a bottom-up attentional bias in the 
first place, which exploits low-level characteristics of the visual scene. In the second 
place, a top-down attentional control is needed in order to establish what is relevant at 
any given moment for a specific type of task, giving rise to the attentional template. 
This holds true for many different types of selection, such as selection based on spatial 
location, on features, or on objects. More recently, another, apparently additional, type 
of bias of attention has been identified, which is the one exerted by reward and in 
general by different types of motivational outcomes.  
In general terms, the possibility of gaining a reward enhances performance in many 
different tasks, both in terms of improved response selection and perceptual 
processing. In a series of studies within the field of visual attention, reward cues have 
been shown to determine an increase in accuracy (Roesch & Olson, 2003) or perceptual 
sensitivity (Engelmann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009), or a decrease in reaction 
times (RTs) without a correspondent decrease of speed-accuracy tradeoff (Roesch & 
Olson, 2003; Taylor, Welsh, Wager, Phan, Fitzgerald, & Gehring, 2004; Small, Gitelman, 
Simmons, Bloise, Parrish, & Mesulam  2005). Given the proactive nature of these tasks 
(reward contingencies were in the above-mentioned cases known since the beginning 
of the trial), an important question becomes whether this behavioral facilitation arises 
as a result of a deliberate, strategic planning, or as an automatic tendency to prioritize 
rewarding stimuli. Moreover, whether volitional or otherwise, at which level of the 
neural processing chain does this benefit in performance arise? Is it only the product of 
9 
 
an improvement in motor selection, configuring then itself simply as a specific type of 
instrumental conditioning, or does it occur because of an actual increase in the visual 
saliency of the stimulus? Which are the effects, and also the side effects, of this type of 
mechanism? Furthermore, can it be classified as an additional type of attentional 
control, or is it a subcomponent of one (or both) of the two already mentioned types of 
bias, namely the endogenous and the exogenous one? 
Benefits and costs of reward in visual attention 
With the aim of dissociating explicit and implicit effects of reward, Kristjánsson and 
colleagues (Kristjansson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver, 2010) performed a study where 
subjects had to look for color singletons and report the orientation of a notch on the 
target. Two colors were paired respectively with a high or a low amount of reward in a 
probabilistic fashion, but, differently from the other study, this association was not 
communicated to participants in advance. Instead of simply considering accuracy and 
RTs for high and low reward trials, they focused their analysis on priming effects, i.e. on 
the benefit in performance when target was repeated. More specifically, priming 
effects in this type of parallel search, i.e. priming of pop-out (PoP), have been shown to 
be a product of a short-term implicit memory system, and to be resistant to top-down 
strategies (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; 2000). First of all, subjects showed better 
performance for the highly rewarded color. Moreover, beyond a replication of the 
priming of pop-out effects after target repetition, data showed a critical interaction 
between reward level and target color repetition, as the product of enhanced priming 
after a rewarding outcome. The extent of this priming was both an effect of search 
history and of last trial outcome, showing a further interaction between reward 
expectation and actual reward achievement. Finally, all these effects tracked changes in 
reward contingency. 
This example only shows advantageous effects due to reward, while, in a study by 
Krebs and colleagues, we can also appreciate detrimental effects of this implicit 
association in a version of the classic color-naming Stroop task (Krebs, Boehler, & 
Woldorff, 2010). Here, subjects viewed words representing colors, written in different 
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inks. They had to respond to the color of the ink and at the same time ignore the 
semantic meaning of the word, which could have either been congruent (i.e. green 
written in green) or incongruent (green written in red). Among four different colors, 
two were linked to a potential reward, and the other two were instead neutral. The 
rewarded color determined a decrease in RT when present in the relevant dimension 
(ink color), and an RT cost when presented in the irrelevant dimension (word meaning). 
This is an instance of a situation where the attentional bias created by reward starts to 
show its negative side effects. 
A perspective on automaticity is given by Bijleveld, in an experiment where subjects 
had to solve a mathematical problem, after receiving a cue which signaled a 
forthcoming high or low reward trial (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010). Crucially, the 
cue could be administered either supraliminally (cue duration 300 ms) or subliminally 
(17 ms). Final outcome depended both on RTs and accuracy, which were then analyzed, 
in both presentation conditions, for high and low reward trials. A dissociation between 
outcome awareness and adopted strategy was made evident: in supraliminal trials, 
subjects were slower but more accurate in the high reward compared to the low 
reward condition. On the contrary, they showed similar accuracy but faster RTs for high 
reward trials in the subliminal condition. The conclusion of the experimenters is that 
reward at stake causes an increase in effort in the task, whether outcome is consciously 
perceived or not. This is translated into a decrease of RTs in subliminal conditions, 
while, in supraliminal ones, there is an additional strategic component which 
modulates speed-accuracy tradeoff by increasing accuracy at the cost of RT. 
Effects of inconsistent schedules of reward  
Although giving hints regarding how reward works in biasing attention, all the 
aforementioned paradigms furnish to subjects an explicit (Krebs et al., 2010) or implicit 
(Kristjansson et al., 2010; Bijleveld et al., 2010) motivation to pay more attention to 
highly rewarded targets, leaving therefore open the possibility for an effect of 
exogenous attention on performance. We will now review a series of experiments 
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where high and low rewards were administered in the absence of any consistent 
object- or feature-reward association. 
In an experiment by Della Libera, subjects first viewed displays (primes) containing a 
big number composed of smaller digits, and had to focus either on the global or on the 
local features depending on a cue that they received at the beginning of the trial (Della 
Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). They received high or low reward for a correct performance, 
and immediately after accomplished a probe trial, where they always had to look at 
local features. RTs and accuracy measures were analyzed as a function of target 
repetition and reward level, and an interaction between reward value and priming was 
found for RTs. When the probe target had been the distractor in the immediately 
preceding prime, negative priming effects were found after high reward and positive 
priming effects after low reward. When the prime and probe target were the same, a 
benefit in RT was present after both high and low reward trials. 
Coherent results were obtained by Hickey and colleagues, who developed a study 
based on the additional singleton paradigm of Theeuwes (1991), where subjects have 
to look for a shape singleton target in an array of uniformly colored distracters. A color 
singleton item can be also present in the array, creating an increased attentional 
capture with respect to other distractors. Color of targets and distracters can stay the 
same or swap between each other from trial to trial, causing respectively a benefit or a 
cost in performance known as inter-trial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). In this 
specific paradigm, participants could receive high or low-magnitude feedback following 
a random schedule, and subsequently the differential effects of the two types of 
outcome on inter-trial priming were analyzed (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a). 
High reward speeded up responses when color stayed the same, and slowed them 
down when color changed, while an opposite pattern was observed for low reward 
trials. In another experiment, this priming shown was to be correlated across subjects 
with high scores in a reward-seeking personality trait (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes 
2010b), as assessed by the BIS/BAS scale of Carver and White (Carver & White, 1994). 
12 
 
Following the same line, Hickey & van Zoest showed that reward history of a visual 
stimulus has a direct, low-level, and non-strategic influence on saccadic movements 
(Hickey & van Zoest, 2012). In every trial, participants had to orient their eyes from a 
central fixation point to a green or red target located at either the top center or bottom 
center of the screen, with correct deployment of the eyes to the target yielding a 
randomly assigned high or low amount of reward. Slightly to the left or right of the 
direct path between fixation and the target, a distractor of the opposite color was 
present. Here as well, color of targets and distractor could stay the same or swap from 
trial to trial. The influence of inter-trial priming was then analyzed, in terms of how 
much the distractor deviated target-directed saccades from their normal path. Trials 
were then binned according to two orthogonal experimental dimensions: amount of 
reward of preceding trial, and color stayed or swap, and were also separated into short, 
mid, and long latency conditions, reflecting the speed with which the saccade was 
initiated after stimulus onset. Short latency target-directed saccades in the high-
reward/color swap condition were drawn more closely to the distractor than saccades 
in the high-reward/same colors condition. In contrast, long latency target-directed 
saccades clearly deviated further away. This shows that, at early stages of the 
deployment of attention, reward-associated stimuli drew attention automatically even 
when not task-relevant. In contrast, the opposite pattern was present in the long 
latency condition, probably as an effect of top-down control counteracting this 
automatic and, in this case, disadvantageous reward bias. 
Reward-dependent learning 
Another series of experiments has taken in consideration the long-lasting effects of 
reward delivery on visual processing, by looking at how previously learned object- and 
feature-reward associations are able to affect target selection during extinction. In a 
study by Della Libera and Chelazzi (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009), subjects underwent 
an extensive training, during which they performed a same/different judgment task on 
a series of shapes. Unbeknownst to participants, for some of these shapes there was a 
bias in the probability of receiving a high or low reward, either when acting as a target 
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or as a distractor. Five days after training, the same shapes were used in a similar 
same/different judgment task and in a visual search task, but this time no feedback was 
delivered. Reward history affected response times during both tasks, such that, during 
the same/different judgment task, items which had been followed by favorable 
outcomes when acting as targets slowed down responses when presented as 
distracters, and vice versa. Conversely, items followed by high reward when presented 
as distracters during training were less easily selected during the same/different 
judgment task, and the opposite happened for shapes paired with low reward. During 
the visual search task, target selection was easier for shapes which had been paired 
with high reward and harder for the ones paired with low reward. Symmetrically, high 
reward associated shapes made search longer when presented as distracters, and the 
opposite pattern was found for low-reward associated shapes.  
Along the same line, Anderson and colleagues designed a study where two colors were 
imbued with different amounts of reward during a training phase (Anderson, Laurent, 
& Yantis, 2011). This phase consisted of a visual search task for targets defined by color. 
Subsequently, subjects performed another visual search task, where they looked for a 
shape singleton among stimuli of various colors. On half of these trials, one of the two 
relevant colors was presented among the others. RTs were affected by presence of any 
of the two colors, but more dramatically by the high-value one. This effect was present 
even when tested several days after the initial training phase, showing a remarkable 
robustness. 
To sum up, the attentional bias for rewarding stimuli appears to be a fast, automatic 
process, which acts primarily by affecting RTs (Bijleveld et al., 2010), proves to be highly 
efficient even when clear explicit cues regarding outcome delivery are missing 
(Kristjansson et al., 2010), but can at the same become possibly detrimental because of 
its long-lasting effects (Anderson et al., 2011) and its partial lack of specificity (Krebs et 
al., 2010). When administered during visual attention tasks, reward increases the 
saliency of objects and features paired with it. This process will, on one side, facilitate 
further selection of the same type of stimulus, but, on the other, it will also cause 
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attentional capture when this stimulus will have to be ignored (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 
2006, Hickey et al., 2010). The interplay between this automatic reward drive and the 
strategic top-down set is therefore a dynamic process, where the two components may 
go hand in hand and contribute synergistically to the same goal, but may also enter 
instead into conflict, and oppose each other. In the latter case, the reward bias has 
shown to manifest itself during early stages of attentional processing, while the re-
establishment of a task-relevant attentional set occurs in later stages (Hickey & van 
Zoest, 2012). All these features suggest the idea that this bias may constitute an 
additional type of control with respect to bottom-up and top-down influences. 
 
Carrot and stick 
As mentioned before, in this thesis I am going to analyze how both reward and 
punishment are able to affect visual representation. Until here we have reviewed a 
series of visual attention paradigms considering how reward is able to affect behavioral 
performance. Much less work is present about the influence of the latter type of 
outcome, punishment, especially in the field of visual attention. Moreover, when taken 
in consideration, this motivational condition is generally intended in terms of threat. 
This is for example the case for a recent study by Schmidt, who investigated the effects 
of a threatening stimulus on the deployment of attention (Schmidt, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2015a). During a fear-conditioning phase, one of two visual stimuli, a blue 
and an orange diamond, was paired with an electrical shock, while the other was not. 
Following conditioning, participants had to perform a visual search task, which is again 
a variant of the additional singleton task of Theeuwes (1991). In one quarter of the 
trials, the CS+ was present as distractor, in another quarter the CS-, and in half of the 
trials none of the two. The presence of any of the two CS increased RT and error rate; 
at the same time, CS+ slowed down responses significantly more than CS-, constituting 
a stronger source of capture. We also observe this automatic orienting when analyzing 
eye movements, similarly to what happens with reward (Hickey & van Zoest, 2012).  In 
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a follow up of the previously cited experiment, Schmidt and colleagues paired a 
stimulus with a mild shock, and compared how this and a neutral stimulus differently 
affected saccadic activity (Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2015b). With respect to 
the neutral object, the threat-associated stimulus elicited faster voluntary saccades, 
and led more frequently to erroneous responses when it had to be ignored. 
Aversive stimuli do not always lead to fear though, as they can also generate a blunter 
feeling of discomfort or disgust, when not considered dangerous. Another important 
study considered how pairing this time an aversive odor with sound affected auditory 
perception (Resnik, Sobel, & Paz, 2011). Conditioning procedure consisted in one group 
in pairing an olfactory aversive unconditioned stimulus (UCS) with one of two pure 
tones (1 and 2 kHz). In the other group the same procedure was followed using a 
pleasant UCS. Before and after conditioning, auditory discrimination thresholds for 
both tones were tested in both groups, and only performance for the CS+ in the 
aversive odor group resulted deteriorated with respect to baseline, while in all the 
other conditions discrimination thresholds ameliorated. Results from this study are 
exactly the opposite with respect to the previous one, suggesting that aversive stimuli 
can have differential effects on perceptual discrimination depending on a series of 
parameters. 
The whole is greater than the sum of its parts 
As far as now we have seen that reward generally acts in the direction of increasing 
saliency, while on the contrary punishment can lead either to an increase or to a 
decrease of attentional deployment. I will now review a series of studies which take 
into consideration not only rewarding or punishing outcomes in isolation, but the two 
of them and also a neutral type of outcome at the same time. This simultaneous 
presence allows for an additional piece of analysis. In fact, reward and punishment 
fulfill two similar but at the same time also opposite functions. Their role in behavior is 
to highlight particularly important stimuli or actions, so that, once they have been 
clearly detected, they can either be pursued, as in the case of reward, or avoided, as in 
the case of punishment. It is then evident how, although sharing one component in 
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their nature, motivational salience (or arousal), they are nevertheless representing 
opposite kinds of motivational valence, and antipodal types of reaction to the stimuli. 
The possibility of considering how both types of outcome plus also a neutral one affect 
attentional control, is then prone to give clearer hints about the true origin and 
significance of this type of bias. If both reward and punishment act toward an increase 
in orienting with respect to the neutral condition, then this bias is likely to reflect 
motivational salience, or arousal. If we consider appetitive and aversive stimuli as 
behaviorally relevant, then their prioritization with respect to neutral stimuli could also 
potentially be the result of strategic planning. If the effects of reward and punishment 
lie instead along opposite poles of the same axis, then this bias is more likely to reflect 
not the strategic, or generally arousing, value of the object, but rather its motivational 
valence. I would like to stress here than every time I am going to talk about salience-
like models, I am going to refer to motivational salience, i.e. the model which would 
attribute perceptual saliency to a stimulus according to its motivational value, and not 
to perceptual salience by itself. 
One of the pioneering studies in the field of the influence of reward in visual attention 
is the one by Small and colleagues (Small et al., 2005). They used a Posner-type 
attentional orienting task, where subjects received a spatial cue at the beginning of 
each trial, which could be either valid (80%) or invalid (20%). After that, they had to 
respond to appearance of targets (90%), or withhold responses during appearance of 
foils (10%). Blocks could be either win-type (money gain for correct detection), lose-
type (avoiding loss for correct detection), or neutral (neither win nor lose money). 
Behavioral results showed an effect in response times, such that in both win and lose 
conditions RT were faster than in neutral blocks, displaying an effect of motivational 
salience on performance. Similar results were obtained by Engelmann and colleagues, 
who also designed a Posner-type task, where participants had to detect a degraded 
face stimulus present either on the left or on the right of fixation (Engelmann et al., 
2009). In each trial, immediately before the target, an endogenous cue was presented, 
predicting target location on 70% of the trials. Motivation was manipulated in a 
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blocked fashion by varying the magnitude and the valence of a monetary incentive 
linked to task performance. Here results show an increase in perceptual sensitivity for 
both types of incentive blocks, regardless of valence. 
But again, a dual pattern arises for the attentional bias caused by aversive stimuli. 
Raymond and O’Brien investigated how imbuing stimuli with value would affect the 
recognition of those same stimuli in a subsequent rapid serial visual presentation task, 
with and without constraints on available attention (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). More 
specifically, two faces were associated with win, two faces with loss, and two with a 
neutral outcome, and afterwards those same faces were presented again among 
others, in a task where subjects had to discriminate first the texture of an abstract 
object (T1) and immediately after the familiarity of a face (T2). Lag between T1 and T2 
could be either long (800 ms), leaving attentional resources intact for both targets, or 
short (200 ms), creating a reduced-attention condition, known to determine an 
attentional blink for T2 (Raymond et al., 1992). They found that, in the full-attention 
condition, recognition was enhanced for both motivationally salient stimuli. On the 
other hand, when attentional resources were reduced, recognition was dramatically 
impaired for the loss- or no outcome-associated condition, but this was not the case for 
win-associated stimuli which showed no attentional blink. 
Similarly, in an experiment by Laufer and Paz, subjects underwent a procedure which is 
a mixture between a classical and instrumental conditioning, where three tones were 
each separately paired with monetary gain, monetary loss or none of the two (Laufer & 
Paz, 2012). A tone discrimination task was performed both before and after the 
conditioning procedure, in order to investigate how motivational conditioning of the 
tones affected sensory discrimination. Data showed a decrease of performance for the 
loss-related tone with respect with the other two. 
Finally, a recent study by Bucker and Theeuwes also supports a valence-like pattern for 
attentional effects of different motivational outcomes (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016). In 
this spatial cuing task, two lines, one diagonal and another one which could be either 
vertical or horizontal, appeared in each trial on the two sides of fixation. Participants 
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had to respond to the latter by discriminating the orientation of the line. A cue which 
consisted in a colored frame appeared before the target on one side of fixation (50% 
validity), with either a short (20 ms) or a long (810 ms) cue-target interval. Each one of 
the three cue colors was paired with a specific outcome at the end of the trial, such 
that one color was paired with monetary gain, one with loss and one was neutral. At 
the same time, participants knew that they had to respond accurately and fast in order 
to receive extra bonus, therefore the cue-outcome pairing elicited classical 
conditioning. Interaction between cue validity and motivational type were analyzed, at 
both short and long cue-target interval. At short intervals, all three types of cue 
facilitated responding at validly cued locations, probably due to a low-level bottom-up 
bias (Yantis & Jonides, 1984). At long intervals though, this facilitation remained for the 
gain-associated cue, disappeared for the neutral cue and reversed for the punishment-
associated cue. This suggests that cues associated with an appetitive outcome can 
strengthen attentional capture and orienting processes, whereas cues associated with 
an aversive outcome reduce attentional capture and promote reorienting. 
To sum up, the attentional bias for motivational stimuli appears more complex when 
considering rewarding and punishing stimuli at the same time. Some studies highlight a 
salience-like effect, both in terms of enhancement of target processing (Small et al., 
2005; Engelmann et al., 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009), better stimulus recognition (full 
attention condition in Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), and in terms of increase of 
attentional capture (Schmidt et al., 2015a). This is a reasonable prediction, considering 
that both types of outcomes spotlight relevant events for the fitness of the individual 
or of the species. At the same time, other studies show an apparently counterintuitive 
pattern, such that stimuli paired with punishment are either not prioritized like 
rewarding ones (limited attention condition in Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), or they are 
discriminated even more poorly (Resnik et al., 2011; Laufer & Paz, 2012), and elicit 
even less orienting (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016) than neutral stimuli. What causes the 
former or latter pattern to become the leading one in shaping the deployment of 
attention? And which could be the evolutionary reason for an attentional bias which 
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only prioritizes rewarding stimuli, but does not underscore, or which even suppresses, 
the ones linked to potentially dangerous or noxious outcomes? 
 
Getting some air 
The paradigm that I have used throughout my project consists in a visual search task for 
high-level categories of objects performed in pictures of real-world environments. This 
is in contrast to the studies I have reviewed until now, which employed abstract and 
simplified displays. Visual search in real-world scenes has shown to present its own 
peculiarities, and therefore, in the final part of this section, I will try to briefly introduce 
this topic. Behavioral performance can vary dramatically depending on the type of 
visual search, and this variability can be addressed through search efficiency, which is 
measured as the relationship between RT and number of distracters in the scene. 
Feature-integration theory (FIT) analyses how the number of features defining the 
target modifies this parameter (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). A search based on a single 
feature (like for example a search for a color singleton), is efficient, with the addition of 
multiple distracters has a marginal effect in the increase of RT for target detection. In 
conjunction search, where multiple features have to be considered in combination, a 
focused deployment of attention to objects in the scene is required. This serial type of 
search is less efficient, and RTs increase almost linearly with the number of items in the 
scene. 
What’s special in naturalistic search? 
Visual search in real-world scenarios has to deal with a long series of issues: scenes are 
cluttered, with no clear pattern of organization, and the objects inside them can appear 
under tremendous changes in location, distance, luminance or orientation. Any high-
level category presents an almost infinite number of possible exemplars, often never 
seen before. All these characteristics would orient to consider this type of search as a 
serial, inefficient one. Surprisingly, visual search in this type of context has proven to be 
extremely fast and efficient. In a study by Thorpe, subjects performed a go/no-go task 
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where they had to decide whether an image presented for only 20 ms contained an 
animal or not (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). Instead of analyzing behavioral measures, 
which would contain not only the time needed for perceptual processing but also the 
interval involved in response execution, ERPs were used. They found a frontal 
negativity centered on frontal recording sites, which was specific to no-go trials and 
developed around 150 ms after stimulus presentation. This short amount of time was 
therefore sufficient to perform the categorization of the scene. In another experiment 
by Wolfe, participants searched for cued objects, in scenes characterized by different 
set sizes, i.e. the number of objects present in the scene (Wolfe, Alvarez, Rosenholtz, 
Kuzmova, & Sherman, 2011). They found that each additional object in the scene only 
added 5 ms to the RT needed for the search, while the correspondent increase was 40 
ms per object in an artificial array. 
What explains this remarkable skill? Search in naturalistic arrays typically involves 
scenarios with which we have developed extremely good familiarity. This is perhaps 
due to our continuous experience with the world, which has been forging our visual 
system through perceptual learning. We do not only encode the regularity of the 
objects that are present in the space, but also the regularity of their arrangement 
within the scenes. According to the phenomenon of ‘contextual cueing’, scene context 
creates a series of expectations about the environment which helps us during its visual 
exploration (Chun, 2000). These expectations regard the set of objects that we are 
likely to find within a specific environment, their location in the scene, and the mutual 
relationship of the objects between each other. The role of experience in this process is 
well illustrated in a study, where the visual skill of radiologists and cytologists in 
interpreting medical images was evaluated (Evans, Georgian-Smith, Tambouret, 
Birdwell, & Wolfe 2013). Surprisingly, image presentations as brief as 250 ms were 
sufficient to garner above-chance performance for detecting subtle abnormalities. In 
synthesis, this means that visual search for high-level category of objects in real-world 
scenes can be classified as an efficient, parallel type of search. 
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As specified in the beginning of the section, search for a target requires the creation of 
an attentional template, an internal representation of the stimulus which will have to 
match the sensory input in order to distinguish target from non-target. This is also the 
case for search in naturalistic scenes, which represent a situation where the specific 
features of the target are often not known in advance, given the extremely high 
variability in the appearance conditions of the stimulus. This gives rise to the issue of 
determining what kind of features could define this template. Behavioral and 
computational studies converge in asserting that the attentional template involved in 
naturalistic search most probably comprises a collection of intermediate-level category-
diagnostic features (Delorme, Richard, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2010; Reeder & Peelen, 2013; 
Ullman, Vidal-Naquet, & Sali, 2002). 
Impact of reward in real-world scenes 
A study by Hickey and colleagues specifically investigates the overlap between 
attentional bias due to reward and visual search in naturalistic scenes (Hickey, Kaiser, & 
Peelen, 2015). In this experiment, participants had to detect one of three real-world 
categories of objects (people, cars or trees) which were cued at the beginning of every 
trial. A correct detection could or could not garner a rewarding feedback (+10 or +0 
points, respectively), on a random schedule. The aim of the study was to look at 
whether a rewarding outcome would have primed the saliency of a high-level category. 
In order to do so, effects on priming and attentional capture were analyzed. No priming 
effect after target repetition was found, possibly because the 100% validity of the cue 
at the beginning of every trial gave the subjects the possibility to fully establish a top-
down attentional set for the target, and a ceiling effect left no room for a benefit in RT 
or accuracy. On the contrary, the presence in the scene of a category paired with 
reward in the preceding trial, led both to an increase in RT and a decrease in accuracy 
(experiment 1) or to an increase in RT (experiment 2 and 3) with respect to the 
condition where the scene still contained the previous correctly detected target, which 
however had not garnered a rewarding outcome as a feedback. In order to understand 
which features of the category were effectively primed by reward, in experiment 3 
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Hickey dissociated two physical components of the “people” visual category. This was 
done by occluding the images representing people through various distractors, and 
leaving scenes where only head and shoulders of a person were shown, and other 
scenes which only contained legs and torso. They found that pairing a legs-and-torso 
type of scene with reward, not only primed the saliency of the corresponding midlevel 
feature, but also the high-level category of bodies. If the following scene contained a 
head-and-shoulder stimulus operating as a distractor, an increase in attentional capture 
was observed, in terms of an increase of RT needed for correct target detection. These 
results not only show that the effects of reward on attention extend to paradigms 
involving naturalistic scenes, but also that, during this type of task, the attentional 
template upon which the motivational bias is able to operate corresponds not only to 
the diagnostic intermediate-level features defining a high-level category on an isolated 
basis, but also to the category itself. 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I will present a behavioral study where participants had to 
search for a series of high-level categories of stimuli in briefly presented real-world 
scenes. These categories (people, cars, trees and houses) were imbued with different 
monetary payoffs: gain, loss or neutral outcome. Participants were informed at the 
beginning of each block about the type of feedback they would have received in case of 
correct performance. We subsequently looked at how these different motivational 
outcomes affected behavioral measures, both in terms of target selection and 
attentional capture. We approached our data using a valence vs salience hypothesis, 
bearing in mind the two opposing models that we highlighted at the beginning of the 
chapter, and which subtend different potential origins of motivational modulation of 
perception and attention. 
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Neural signatures of reward and punishment in perception 
 
In the previous section, I have tried to delineate how reward and punishment affect 
behavioral measures of visual attention. In this section, I will review some studies 
which look at how this is implemented on a neural level. 
Hints from the spikes 
A series of electrophysiological studies have investigated how the expectation of 
reward modulates neuronal activity in the brain of the monkey. Roesch and Olson, for 
example, recorded activity from a number of frontal areas during a visual task, where 
the animal had to maintain in memory the location of a directional cue before making 
a saccade to it after a specific amount of time (Roesch & Olson, 2003). Each trial 
began with a central cue signaling whether correct performance would have lead to a 
big or small reward. As already mentioned in previous section, both RT and accuracy 
measures showed an improvement in the high reward condition. Moreover, many 
frontal regions showed a correspondent increase in firing: dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC), frontal eye field (FEF), a transitional zone caudal to the frontal eye field 
(FEF/PM), premotor cortex (PM), and the rostral part of the supplementary motor 
area (SMAr). In a study by Platt and Glimcher, neuronal activity of lateral intra-parietal 
(LIP) area was investigated (Platt & Glimcher, 1999). Here, monkeys had to make a 
saccade either to an eccentric LED which elicited a movement for which the LIP 
neuron was maximally active (in the response field (RF)), or to another eccentric LED 
for which the neuron was minimally active (out of the RF). Each trial started with the 
fixation of a central LED, whose change in color, after a delay, instructed the monkey 
to make a saccade toward one of the two eccentric locations, in order to get a reward 
whose amount (in one case) or probability (in another case) varied from high to low 
across blocks. In both instances, the high (amount/probability) reward condition led 
to an increase in the firing rate of the LIP neuron, during the interval before the 
direction of the eye movement to be performed was made evident. Similar results 
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about an increase of activation of LIP neurons during reward expectation were 
obtained in another relevant experiment by Sugrue (Sugrue et al., 2004). 
Activity of neurons in superior colliculus (SC) of the monkey was recorded in a study 
by Ikeda & Hikosaka (2003). Here a cue, which could have been either in or out of the 
RF of the cell, instructed the movement to be made after a delay. In each block in an 
alternating fashion, only one movement direction (toward or away from RF) could 
garner a reward, with reward delivery orthogonal to the direction of the appropriate 
movement, leading therefore to four different conditions. Like before, the upcoming 
reward determined an increase in the firing rate of the neuron, but only when the 
movement had to be performed within the RF of the neuron. Interestingly, this 
happened either in a reactive (after the receipt of outcome) or in a proactive (before 
reward delivery) fashion, in gain-type and bias-type neurons respectively. The gain 
modulation was thought to be primarily induced by cortical inputs (FEF, SEF and LIP), 
and the bias modulation by the input from basal ganglia, and more specifically from 
the caudate nucleus (CD).  
Accordingly, a couple of interesting studies address the role of the CD in visual 
attention, and more precisely of its tail region. This part of the CD is mostly unique to 
primates (Hjornevik et al., 2007), and receives inputs mainly from inferior temporal 
(IT) cortex. This region is hypothesized to be specifically relevant for object-skill, i.e. 
the ability to perform fast and accurate detection of a learned visual stimulus. This 
type of skill represents the perceptual counterpart of action-skill, i.e. the ability to fast 
and accurately perform a stereotyped motor response (Hikosaka, Yamamoto, Yasuda, 
& Kim, 2013). In a study by Yamamoto and colleagues, neurons of the caudate tail 
(CDt) were recorded while monkeys performed an object-directed saccade task, a 
passive-viewing task and a free-viewing task, always looking at the same abstract 
fractal figures (Yamamoto, Monosov, Yasuda, & Hikosaka, 2012). First of all, neurons 
of CDt encoded identity and location of the visual objects. Secondly, when stimulated, 
they elicited movements in the direction of the preferred location. Third, they 
increased their firing just before saccades were made to the same direction. This 
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study therefore supports the hypothesis that object-skill is mediated by a neural 
circuit involving a specific portion of the basal ganglia. A subsequent work by the 
same author investigated the effects of adding reward to a subset of the stimuli 
(Yamamoto, Kim, & Hikosaka, 2013). Reward association procedure was either 
flexible, with reward contingencies changing across blocks, or stable, with fixed 
associations learned throughout several days. CDt neurons showed an enhanced 
response for stimuli previously associated with reward (even at extinction), but only in 
the stable association procedure. The association between stimuli and reward was 
learnt also in the alternative schedule, as shown by a strong gaze bias toward reward-
associated stimuli in the flexible procedure but this was not reflected in an increase of 
neuronal firing in CDt. This suggests a specific involvement of the region in the 
retrieval of long-term visual associations. 
Reward-related neural activation  
We have briefly considered a series of studies which address how the prospect of 
reward is able to modulate spiking of neurons in different regions of the monkey 
brain. Neuronal recordings provide us with exceptional spatial and temporal 
resolution, and the animal experimental setting allows task manipulations which are 
not conceivable when working with human participants. At the same time, it is 
difficult to abstract these findings to the realm of visual attention, as the relevant role 
of oculomotor selection in all of these tasks is prone to generate possible confounds. 
In order to examine how reward expectation modulates activation of different areas 
of the human brain, we can reconsider the aforementioned study by Engelmann, 
where participants had to detect a degraded face stimulus presented either on the 
left or on the right of fixation (Engelmann et al., 2009). Target presentation occurred 
after appearance of a directional cue which could be valid (70%) or invalid, and 
motivation was manipulated block wise by varying the magnitude of cash incentive 
linked to performance. Beyond an increase in dprime for the incentive blocks, they 
also found a correspondent increase in activation in bilateral IPS, FEF, anterior insula 
and right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG) throughout the block. There was also an 
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increase in activation in incentive blocks during the cue period in all the 
aforementioned regions and in right substantia nigra (SN)/midbrain, anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), pre-supplementary and supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA/SMA), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), CD, putamen, and thalamus. 
 
Reward or attention? 
All the previously reviewed studies represent proactive paradigms, where the 
response of the animals or of the participants to cues predicting the delivery of 
reward was analyzed. A relevant commentary by Maunsell legitimately questions 
whether all these experiments actually took into consideration reward or more simply 
attention (Maunsell, 2004). Given that subjects knew in advance the type of outcome 
they would have received if performing correctly, and that reward and attention were 
not separately manipulated, results would not allow disentanglement between these 
two components. A series of countermeasures have been taken in order to overcome 
this issue, which in part trace what we have already seen at the behavioral level, and 
in part differ and specifically depend on the type of technique in consideration. 
Pessiglione and colleagues developed the paradigm which was subsequently adopted 
by Bijleveld in the abovementioned study (Bijleveld et al., 2010). In this case, instead 
of performing a mathematical problem, subjects needed to exert force on a hand grip, 
whose amount was made visible to them by the liquid line on a thermometer shown 
on a screen (Pessiglione et al., 2007). The higher the fluid level rose, the more of the 
monetary stake they would get, but the total at stake varied in each trial from one 
penny to one pound. Critically, the total amount they could gain was communicated 
at the beginning of every trial either at a supraliminal or at a subliminal level (display 
duration of 100 ms in the first case, and 17 or 50 ms in the second), and differences in 
behavior and brain activation were analyzed for the different conditions. On a 
behavioral level, significant effects were found at 100, 50, and even at 17 ms between 
the different stakes, showing that even a subliminal presentation was sufficient to 
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energize performance. In the conscious condition, difference between the high and 
low reward condition garnered differential level of activation in a region which 
extended bilaterally in the basal forebrain, bordering several structures encompassing 
the ventral striatum (VS), ventral pallidum (VP), extended amygdala, and basal 
nucleus of Meynert. They next looked at the engagement of this circuit by subliminal 
incentives, and found that, over the pallidal voxels that showed significant activation 
in the conscious condition, the contrast between monetary stakes was significant for 
50 ms but not for 17 ms. These results suggest the involvement of this basal forebrain 
region both in conscious and unconscious conditions. 
Stimulation by reward (apparently also at a subliminal level) led therefore to an 
increase in activation in the above mentioned subcortical structures on a neural level, 
and to a decrease in RT on a behavioral level. Interestingly, basal ganglia have been 
highlighted as a brain area critical to the assessment of the speed-accuracy tradeoff 
also in other contexts. Forstmann and colleagues designed a paradigm in order to 
localize regions involved in facilitating decision-making under time pressure. 
Participants were asked to perform the same type of task (a standard moving dot 
task) under three different conditions: speeded, accurate or normal (Forstmann et al., 
2008). They found that anterior striatum and pre-SMA selectively activated in the 
speeded condition, and that, across subjects, activation in these areas was inversely 
correlated with the individual “response caution” as estimated by a mathematical 
model for cognitive decision-making. It seems therefore that this relationship 
between increased activation in striatum and faster response is not exclusive to 
reward, but rather the expression of a more general mechanism of behavior 
regulation. Reward could then be just one of the variables triggering this system. 
Another strategy to disentangle reward and attention is represented by the 
independent manipulation of these two variables. This was the rationale behind a 
study by Krebs and colleagues, where a cue at the beginning of each trial predicted on 
one hand the location and the difficulty level (easy vs hard) of the upcoming visual 
discrimination task, and on the other, orthogonally to that, the potential to win 
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money in that trial (money vs no money) (Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 
2012). Actual task execution was temporally separated from this phase, so that it was 
possible to distinguish neural response related to anticipation of these two variables 
from the one related to reward receipt. Expectation of reward selectively increased 
activation in Nacc, PCC and calcarine sulcus (V1), while difficulty level selectively 
engaged dlPFC and pre-SMA. Both factors increased activity in inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG), anterior insula, IPS, dorsal striatum and SC. Finally, in addition to these main 
effects in partly overlapping and partly selective regions, an interaction between the 
two effects was found in the SN/ventral tegmental (VTA) complex, the posterior 
thalamus/pulvinar, the right caudate body, and the right anterior midcingulate cortex 
(aMCC). Regarding the interaction effect, the analysis of the blood-oxygen-level 
dependent (BOLD) signal extracted from ROIs centered at the local activity maxima, 
revealed that this effect was driven in all of the regions by a selective activity increase 
for cues predicting both reward and high difficulty. 
Anderson and colleagues performed an imaging study to look at how previous reward 
affects representation of visual stimuli (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2014). Here, just 
like in previous paradigm, they tested the effects of previously learnt reward 
associations during extinction, after a procedure where one of two colors was 
associated with a high probability, and another one with a low probability of reward. 
During the test phase, participants searched for a shape-defined target among stimuli 
of different colors, with the previously reward-associated color occasionally defining 
one of the distractor elements of the array. The imaging data from the training phase 
served as a basis to independently define three ROIs, extrastriate visual cortex, 
frontal-parietal regions and striatum, whose activity was then evaluated during the 
test phase. The analysis of the activity of these three ROIs during extinction was 
aimed at explaining the origin of value-driven attentional signals. If value-driven 
attention simply reflects increased sensitivity to reward-associated features, we would 
expect enhanced activation in early visual areas in the absence of any additional 
control signal. If this phenomenon is the consequence of perseveration in pursuing 
29 
 
preceding goals that have been reinforced by rewarding feedback, increased activity 
in the frontal-parietal regions involved in top-down selection is foreseen. Finally, a 
third possibility conjectures value-driven attentional priority signals arising from the 
basal ganglia, which are implied both in reward processing and habitual responding. 
During presentation of a reward-associated distractor, BOLD signal displayed an 
increased level of activation within extrastriate regions (bilaterally and beyond whole-
brain correction), in IPS (only when distractor was presented in the right hemifield) 
and CDt (bilaterally, but without passing whole-brain correction when distractor was 
presented on right hemifield). No difference was present between activation induced 
by high- and low-reward associated stimuli. At the same time, no increased activation 
in the test phase was found when a similar task was performed, if no reward was 
delivered during the training phase. Increased activation of IPS for reward-associated 
distractor is interpreted by the author as the result of competition among stimuli 
within the priority map (somehow in contrast with the initial motivations of the study 
for investigating fronto-parietal activity), while the recruitment of CDt supports a role 
played by this region of basal ganglia in the establishment of value-driven attention. 
Overall, a selective activation by reward is mostly observed at the level of striatum 
(either VS (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Krebs et al., 2012) or CDt (Anderson et al., 2014), 
PCC and primary visual regions. Increased activation in other regions of the brain, 
such as dlPFC and IPS, seems to be more closely linked to the increase of attention. 
This dissociation on the neural level reminds of another important dichotomy: the 
one highlighted by Daw and colleagues with respect to behavioral control (Daw, Niv, & 
Dayan, 2005). They consider the opponency between the system supporting habitual 
or reflexive control (dopamine afferents and basal ganglia), and the one associated 
with more reflective and cognitive action planning (prefrontal cortex). In their work, 
they question in the first place why the brain should rely on different controllers, and 
secondly how the contrast between these two systems could be regulated in case of 
conflict. They propose that different classes of reinforcement learning methods are 
able to depict advantages and limitations of each system. Classical and instrumental 
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learning is best modeled by temporal-difference learning. This is a model-free 
reinforcement learning method, which is based on ‘caching’, the association of an 
action or situation with a scalar summary of its long-run future value. Working with 
cached values is computationally simple but bears the disadvantage of rigidity: the 
values do not immediately change with the re-valuation of the outcome. By contrast, 
the function of prefrontal circuit is better represented by model-based reinforcement 
learning. This method involves exploring a branching set of possible future situations 
based on different actions, and constructing predictions of long-run outcomes on the 
fly. These computations can be expensive in terms of memory and time, but at the 
same time enable to react more flexibly to changing circumstances, as when 
outcomes are re-valued. Depending on the need for flexibility or speed, the brain will 
therefore have to determine the controller whose predictions are going to be most 
suitable for the situation. The authors develop a formal, computational model which 
suggests how this trade-off could be regulated.  
In light of these ideas, the abovementioned contraposition between “reward” and 
“attention” could then be put into another perspective. Rather than constituting 
independent concepts, these two processes could instead represent situations where 
the same target is achieved by the means of different cognitive tools. The behavioral 
phenomena and the neural activation linked to the construct of “reward” could be 
attributed to a rudimentary, fast and automatic instrument involved in the detection 
and pursuit of rewarding stimuli, while “attention” would represent the product of a 
more elaborate, time-consuming and conscious system deployed to the same aim. We 
can deepen this idea by comparing the constructs of valence and salience. 
Valence vs Salience 
As already considered, another important strategy which has been developed in order 
to disentangle reward from attention is the one of using opposite types of 
motivational outcomes, reward and punishment, within the same paradigm.  
Valence and salience across the cortex 
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For instance, in a follow-up of their previous electrophysiological study regarding the 
effects of reward, Roesch and Olson investigated the conjoint effect of reward and 
punishment in frontal cortex. Spiking activity of neurons of two regions, namely 
orbitofrontal (OFC) and premotor (PMC) cortex, were recorded in two monkeys during 
cue display and outcome delivery of rewards or punishments, which could have also 
been of either small or large entity (Roesch & Olson, 2004). A dissociation was found 
within the frontal lobe, such that in PMC, on the one hand, both stimuli with high 
salience determined an increase of the activity of neurons which encoded the 
movement that the monkey had to make in order to get the reward or to avoid the 
punishment. In OFC, on the other hand, activity of neurons was representing value in 
an ascending fashion from negative to neutral to reward. A salience-like type of 
response was also found by Kobayashi and colleagues, in a study were lateral PFC 
neurons were recorded during a memory guided saccade task for three different 
outcomes, a liquid reward, an aversive air puff and a neutral sound (Kobayashi, 
Nomoto, Watanabe, Hikosaka, Schultz, & Sakagami, 2006). Here, some neurons (the 
highest percentage) were found to be more responsive to rewarding outcomes, some 
to punishing ones, and some to both kinds of salient outcomes. 
The same rationale led to a study where neurons in LIP were recorded in the monkey 
(Leathers & Olson, 2012). Here, the animal chose in each trial between cues placed in 
and opposite to the neuronal response field. Eight different cues signaled four 
possible outcomes, arising from the orthogonal combination of value and magnitude, 
so big and small reward, and big and small punishment. Two images of this pool were 
presented at the beginning of each trial, and the monkey had to make a saccade to 
the preferred one in order to receive the corresponding outcome. Neuronal firing 
during the cue period was higher for the large vs small condition, irrespective of the 
value of the outcome, showing a representation of salience. Importantly, monkeys 
consistently chose the offer with the better value, so that, for example, in the case of 
choice between two different levels of punishment, preferred value and magnitude of 
the cues differed. 
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Analogous results about frontal regions are present from imaging studies in humans. 
In a study by Litt, human participants were shown pictures of food items that ranged 
from being highly disliked to highly liked and were asked to make a choice whether or 
not they would like to eat the item after the experiment (Litt, Plassmann, Shiv, & 
Rangel, 2011). For each picture, participants entered their response on one of the 
four choices: “Strong No”, “No”, “Yes” or “Strong Yes”. These four types of responses 
were used to define value and salience signals. Areas showing an activation 
dependent on valence were medial OFC (mOFC), rostral ACC (rACC) and dorsal PCC 
(dPCC). Salience-based activation was instead observed in dorsal ACC (dACC), SMA 
and insula. Interestingly, VS showed a peculiar type of activation, which depended 
both on saliency and on valence. In the imaging study by Engelmann described at the 
beginning of the section, blocks with payoffs of increasing magnitude but also 
opposite valence were used, leaving therefore open the possibility to highlight 
valence and salience regions in a similar way (Engelmann et al., 2009). In this case, 
however, differently from the previous study, all the aforementioned areas (bilateral 
IPS, FEF, anterior insula and rMFG, ACC, pre-SMA/SMA, PCC, caudate, putamen and 
thalamus) showed a main effect of salience, with no area showing any effect of 
valence. 
Valence and salience below the cortex 
In the study by Litt (2011), we have seen that activation in VS showed a pattern of 
activation which depended both on valence and on salience. A study by Cooper and 
Knutson (Cooper & Knutson, 2008) was specifically aimed at investigating the 
relationship between valence and salience within this region. Here, each trial started 
with one of six cue types: two levels of certainty (“certain”/“uncertain”) crossed with 
three levels of reward (“gain”/“neutral”/“loss”). After a variable delay period, a visual 
target appeared and participants pressed a button while the target was on the screen. 
Valence signals were found in the NAcc when outcomes were “certain” (i.e., 
independent of performance) and salience signals when outcomes were “uncertain” 
(i.e., based on performance). A more recent study tries to disentangle representation 
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of motivation and expected value (EV) in the striatum using a similar approach (Miller, 
Shankar, Knutson, & McClure, 2014). Subjects were presented with a cue at the 
beginning of the trial which anticipated probability of receiving reward and, 
orthogonal to that, the amount of reward eventually received (high or low). Task 
consisted in pressing a button as soon as a probe appeared on the screen, from 2 to 
4.5 sec after the cue. Activation in the caudate and putamen correlated with 
motivation (salience), while activation in Nacc was related to differences in the 
subjective value of anticipated reward (valence). For comparable results see also 
Knutson (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001). 
A similar dissociation between salience and valence has been observed in another 
subcortical structure whose role is fundamental for motivation, i.e. VTA/SNc. Since 
the groundbreaking work by Schultz (Schultz, 2000; Schultz, 2006), the activity of 
dopaminergic neurons has been deemed central for the comprehension of the 
mechanisms through which reward is capable of modulating behavior and attention. 
Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009) recorded the activity of midbrain dopamine neurons 
during a Pavlovian conditioning procedure, and they found two different neuronal 
populations. Neurons of the former group, located more ventrally, in ventromedial 
SNc and lateral VTA, were excited by rewarding stimuli and inhibited by aversive 
stimuli, giving rise to a motivational value signal. Neurons of the latter group, located 
mostly in dorsolateral SNc, were excited by both rewarding and aversive stimuli, 
giving rise to a motivational salience signal. Bromberg-Martin and colleagues 
(Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010) hypothesize that these two types 
of signal would be delivered to different parts of the brain. The motivational value 
signal would be retransmitted to areas implied in value learning and choice 
evaluation. Indeed, ventromedial SNc and VTA project to vmPFC, including OFC 
(Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1998), and to VS, in particular to Nacc shell (Haber, 
Fudge, & McFarland, 2000). The motivational salience signal would be instead 
retransmitted to regions implicated in orienting, cognitive processing and general 
motivation. Dopamine neurons from dorsolateral midbrain do project to dorsal and 
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lateral frontal cortex (Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1998), and also to Nacc core (Day, 
Roitman, Wightman, & Carelli 2007; Anstrom, Miczek, & Budygin, 2009). This major 
division could explain the already mentioned dissociation of representation that we 
find in frontal cortex, as much as the dual representation found within VS. Finally, 
dorsal striatum receives inputs both from motivational value and from motivational 
salience neurons, so that its functions could benefit from both types of signal 
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). 
The constructs of valence and salience enable us to better characterize the 
contraposition of neural structures that we had already found with respect to the 
“reward vs attention” debate. At the cortical level, on one side, we find areas 
traditionally involved in the endogenous modulation of attention, such as FEF, dlPFC, 
SMA and IPS, and areas involved in aspecific arousal such as dACC and the insula. 
These areas are activated by both rewarding and punishing outcomes, and seem to be 
the most likely candidates for a network of regions modulated by attention. On the 
other side, we find cortical areas involved in the establishment of value, such as OFC, 
rACC and PCC, which are instead modulated according to a valence-like pattern. On 
the subcortical side, studies suggest that both types of models are represented within 
basal ganglia, even though the valence model seems to be preferably represented at 
the level of VS/NAcc, and the salience model at the level of dorsal striatum. Both 
types of models are also represented in the SN/VTA complex. This is consistent with 
the results of a recent meta-analysis by Bartra, which takes into consideration 206 
published fMRI studies investigating neural correlates of subjective value (SV) (Bartra, 
McGuire, & Kable, 2013). In sum, dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC), bilateral anterior insula, 
bilateral thalamus and dorsal striatum show the conjunction of positive and negative 
effects of SV, while bilateral VS, vmPFC and PCC come out in the reward vs 
punishment contrast. 
Competitive dynamics between valence and salience 
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A study by Knutson exemplifies the interplay between motivational valence and 
salience in an auction task (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007). 
Subjects received, at the beginning of the experiment, an amount of money that they 
could have kept or spent on a series of articles shown during scanning. During each 
trial, participants were presented first with one product shown by itself (a), then with 
its price (b), and immediately after with the decision of whether or not to purchase 
the article (c). At the end of scanning, they rated products on several dimensions (i.e., 
desirability, percentage of retail price that they would be willing to pay for the 
product, and whether or not they already owned the product). Preference for the 
article during phase (a) and (b) was correlated with NAcc activation; price differential 
(i.e., the difference between what the subject was willing to pay and the displayed 
product price) was correlated with activation in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
during the price (b) period. Finally, purchasing was correlated with deactivation of the 
bilateral insula during the choice period (c). This study suggests an immediate 
affective reaction to potential gains and losses, which serve together as inputs for a 
subsequent, more thoughtful assessment. 
Finally, another instance where regions of the salience and of the valence network 
work in opposition is the already mentioned study by Laufer and Paz (Laufer & Paz, 
2012). Here, three tones were differentially paired either with monetary gain, with 
monetary loss or with none of the two. Subjects were scanned while performing an 
auditory discrimination task on the three tones after the conditioning procedure. As 
already illustrated, they showed a decrease of performance for the loss-related tone 
with respect with the other two. Interestingly, the higher the activity in insula, dACC 
and dorsomedial nucleus of thalamus during the conditioning process, the less the 
impairment of performance of the subject for the loss-related tone. Given that the 
standard response after experience with a stimulus is an improved performance (as 
seen with neutral and gain-related tones), an interpretation of this data is that 
automatic aversive responses to punishing stimuli impaired in some way their sensory 
processing. Higher activity in this network allowed the subject to inhibit these 
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automatic responses and process also aversive stimuli according to a more neutral and 
potentially strategic approach. 
 
Tricks of threat 
Throughout this thesis, the relationship between the different motivational outcomes 
has always been conceived either in terms of a salience effect, with a prioritization of 
relevant outcomes with respect to neutral ones, or in terms of a positively valenced 
bias, with a stronger representation of stimuli paired with reward with respect to the 
ones paired with punishment. A third framework should also be taken in 
consideration, though, which is the one where loss presents an impact which is 
stronger than the one due to reward, i.e. an inverse valence effect. Evidence for a 
similar pattern is given by Baumeister and colleagues, who address the direct 
comparison between these two outcomes across a wide range of contexts 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). The review spans studies 
concerned with reaction to events, effects on relationships, appraisal and regulation of 
emotions, memory, development and, critically, information processing. Overall, they 
find a consistent prioritization of punishing stimuli with respect to rewarding ones, 
synthesizing this evidence in the formula according to which “bad is stronger than 
good”. There are clear evolutionary reasons for why this should be the case, when 
considering the extreme consequences of these two opposing outcomes in the natural 
environment. While disregard for a rewarding stimulus can indeed cause the loss of a 
potential gain, neglect of important dangers may nevertheless result in more serious, 
long-lasting effects, such as maiming or death. 
Among the studies of this review, the one by Pratto and John (1991) has a similar 
rationale as the modified Stroop task which we have already considered in a previous 
section (Krebs et al., 2010). In this experiment, participants named the colors in which 
words indicating socially desirable and undesirable traits were printed. Across three 
different paradigms, color-naming latencies were longer for undesirable with respect 
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to desirable traits. Moreover, subjects displayed a higher rate of incidental learning for 
undesirable traits, showing that this effect was not due to effects of cognitive effort 
aimed at keeping threatening material from entering consciousness. The increased 
incidental learning for undesirable traits suggests instead that, at the expense of 
reduced attention to the task-relevant dimension (color), automatic vigilance to the 
task-irrelevant dimension (word) was increased in the case of negatively valenced 
stimuli with respect to positively valenced ones. 
An almond-shaped fear 
Correlates of this bias have also been highlighted on a neural level. In a study by 
Vuilleumier and colleagues, subjects performed a matching task for pairs of stimuli 
presented at specific cued locations (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). In 
each trial, pictures of two faces and two houses were displayed, and, depending on 
their position relatively to the spatial cue, one of the two categories alternatively 
represented the task-relevant or task-irrelevant one. Moreover, faces could be fearful 
or neutral. Activation of left and right fusiform gyrus (FG) by faces was affected by 
attentional condition, as a result of top-down modulation. At the same time, right FG 
also showed a main effect of expression type independently of attentional condition, 
such that fearful faces produced increased activation irrespectively of whether the 
faces were attended or not. At the same time, the left amygdala showed a main effect 
of expression, but no main effect of attentional condition. 
The FG is implicated in the interpretation of high-level visual stimuli, with a specific 
focus on faces in the fusiform face area (FFA) (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; 
Elbich & Scherf, 2016). The increase in activation of FG in the presence of fearful 
expressions, irrespectively of the task-relevance of the type of face expression, has 
been interpreted as the product of an additional, automatic control, which enhances 
representation of threatening stimuli irrespectively of deliberate selective attention 
(Vuilleumier, 2005). The amygdala, which activates in response to (even not consciously 
perceived) aversive stimuli (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003) and 
presents a direct and strong connection with inferior temporal cortex (Amaral, Behniea, 
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& Kelly, 2003), has been posited as the main neural substrate for this independent 
attentional control. According to this view, then, the exogenous, endogenous, and 
emotional controls would therefore constitute three different sources of bias, 
operating independently from each other. Evidence for this hypothesis has been 
provided by Brosch and colleagues, both on a behavioral and on an 
electrophysiological level (Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011). In a dot-
probe task, valid and invalid exogenous, endogenous and emotional cues were 
manipulated orthogonally. The analysis of RTs showed that attentional facilitation for 
the three different types of valid cues added up linearly. In a second experiment, the 
same paradigm was optimized to analyze the effects of the exogenous and the 
emotional bias at the level of ERP. The analysis showed that the two attentional effects 
presented non-overlapping temporal foci, which were related in one case to low-level 
properties of the stimulus and in the other to its emotional content. 
A twisted mind 
Apparently, though, the whole picture seems to be more articulated than the one 
presented up to now. In a dot-probe task, MacLeod and colleagues compared the 
attentional bias towards aversive stimuli in clinically anxious and control subjects 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Two words, one of which could have been 
threat-related, were briefly presented on a screen along a vertical axis. Immediately 
after, a dot could have (or could have not) appeared in one of the two positions 
previously occupied by the words. Latencies for probe detection were calculated for 
trials where a threat-related word has appeared, and evaluated as a function of 
whether the aversive word had appeared in the same or in the other position with 
respect to the dot. Clinically anxious participants displayed an attentional bias 
towards threat-related words. Surprisingly though, control participants shifted 
attention away from the same type of stimuli, suggesting the presence of an opposite 
type of bias. Other studies showed similar results, such that in general this 
attentional bias towards aversive stimuli is stronger in high trait anxiety individuals 
than in low trait anxiety ones, or present only in the former group, while the latter 
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one rather displays avoidance towards the same type of stimuli (Mogg et al., 1995; 
Vandenhout, Tenney, Huygens, Merckelbach, & Kindt, 1995). 
This dichotomic response according to personality led to the formulation of the 
interaction hypothesis, according to which high trait anxious individuals show a 
preattentive bias towards aversive stimuli, while low trait anxious individuals a 
preattentive bias away from them (MacLeod & Matthews, 1988). Nevertheless, a 
similar framework leads to the unintuitive situation where highly aversive, and 
therefore also potentially highly relevant, stimuli determine a great increase of 
selective attention in highly anxious individuals, but at the same time a complete 
neglect of the same type of information in the remaining low trait anxious population. 
 In order to account for this discrepancy, a cognitive-motivational model was 
subsequently elaborated by Mogg and Bradley (1988). According to this view, the 
relationship between the subjective threat value and attentional bias is not linear. 
When the threat value of the stimuli is low, then selective attention will shift away 
from them; when it is high, the response will be opposite, and lead to their 
prioritization (Fig. 1.1). Individual differences would therefore simply lie in the 
threshold given by each subject, with highly anxious individuals shifting from 
suppression to prioritization for elements with a lower level of threat. 
Interestingly, we also find evidence for an opposite influence of this personality trait 
on the bias for positively valenced stimuli. In another experiment by Mogg and Bradley 
(1999), attentional capture for different types of emotional faces (happy, neutral, 
threatening) was evaluated in a dot-probe task. When considering the effects of type 
of emotional faces (happy and threatening) and of personality trait, an interaction was 
found between these two factors, such that while high trait anxiety individuals showed 
a stronger bias for threatening faces with respect to low trait anxiety ones, an opposite 
trend was found for happy faces. Moreover, we have previously seen that the 
activation of the amygdala has been hypothesized as a potential source for this 
additional aversive bias. In a task where participants viewed masked and non-masked 
versions of fearful and neutral faces, a correlation was also found between trait 
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anxiety level of participants, and activation of basolateral amygdala by masked 
expressions of fear (Etkin et al., 2004). 
 
Do we find studies which address this question not only by relating it to personality 
traits of different participants, but also to the level of intensity of the stimulus? In a 
recent study by Simola and colleagues (Simola, Le Fevre, Torniainen, & Baccino, 2015), 
eye movements and eye-fixation-related potentials (EFRPs) were recorded while 
subjects observed emotional scenes categorized according to two orthogonal 
dimensions: valence (unpleasant, pleasant) and arousal (high, low). Fixations rates, 
gaze durations and two specific electrophysiological indices time-locked to the fixation 
of emotionally salient items, P2 and LPP, all displayed a similar interaction between 
valence and arousal. More specifically, all these parameters showed an enhanced 
response to pleasant stimuli with respect to unpleasant ones in the low arousal 
condition, and an enhanced response to unpleasant stimuli with respect to pleasant 
ones in the high arousal condition. Therefore, this variability in response to items of the 
same valence with different levels of arousal seems also to be present within subjects 
across stimulus intensity, and not only across subjects.  
Fig. 1.1 Hypothetical relationship 
between the attentional bias and 
the subjective threat value of 
stimuli (adapted from Mogg and 
Bradley, 1988). 
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On a similar note, studies making use of different type of emotional faces (Ohman, 
Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) found that while threatening and fearful faces (negative 
valence, high arousal) biased attention, sad ones (negative valence, low arousal) did 
not. Finally, a similar interaction has been recently highlighted also on a decision-
making dimension (Sussman, 2017). When people evaluated past experiences, they 
tended to prefer positive outcomes that had lower magnitudes of contributing gains 
and losses. On the contrary, when negative outcomes were considered, subjects 
preferred outcomes with higher magnitudes of contributing gains and losses. This 
finding suggests that a similar pattern may apply also to other cognitive processes 
beyond the realm of visual attention, and present a broader adaptational meaning. 
We have already talked about the evolutionary reasons why a bad outcome could be 
“stronger than good”. At the same time, we also find that, depending on personality 
and also on the intensity of the stimulus, sometimes “good is stronger than bad”. If so, 
why? Taylor and Brown have addressed this question on a broad level, similarly to the 
wide-ranging review by Baumeister (Taylor & Brown, 1988). They claim that, contrary 
to the old concept of the healthy individual as someone who perceives reality 
accurately (Jahoda, 1958), a large amount of evidence has accrued with time which 
shows that the healthy individual is subject to a series of positive illusions, such as 
unrealistically positive vision of the self, illusions of control and unrealistic optimism. 
Apparently, these cognitive biases have a role in emotional regulation, inasmuch as 
they help coping with a potentially overwhelming environment. In fact, it has been 
found that individuals with low self-esteem or moderately depressed are the ones who 
are less prone to the abovementioned types of biases. 
 
Patterns in the brain 
Until here, my analysis has been focusing on how reward and punishment affect 
univariate activation in different areas of the brain. In this project, though, I am going 
to investigate how these two outcomes modulate the amount of category information 
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in object-selective cortex (OSC), as assessed through Multivariate Pattern Analysis 
(MVPA). This type of analysis has been shown to represent a powerful tool in order to 
investigate how various types of stimuli and functions are represented within the 
brain. Seminal work by Haxby and colleagues (2001) examined how different 
categories of real-world objects are encoded in one of the fundamental regions 
dealing with visual object representation, namely ventral temporal cortex. In this 
study, participants performed a simple one-back task while looking at different 
exemplars of the same category in each block. Categories used in the study comprised 
natural stimuli (faces and cats), man-made objects (houses, chairs, scissors, shoes, 
and bottles), and nonsense, scrambled images. Ventro-temporal cortex of participants 
showed to reliably represent different high-level categories of objects. 
MVPA of natural scenes 
Again, we will now move from tasks performed in abstract, simplified arrays, to a 
more ecological approach based on visual search in real-world scenarios. A study by 
Peelen found that, when looking at complex natural scenes during a category 
detection task, the pattern of fMRI activity elicited in OSC retains information about 
the category of objects that the subject is actively looking for (Peelen, Fei-Fei, & 
Kastner, 2009). Data revealed that information about the target was present in OSC 
even from parts of the visual field which happened to be task-irrelevant and which 
were presented outside the focus of spatial attention. This suggests the presence of a 
top-down mechanism capable of biasing category representation for all areas of the 
visual field, whether they are actively attended or not. In another study by Peelen and 
Kastner, a cue at the beginning of the trial signaled the type of category to detect, but 
some cues were not followed by the actual presentation of the scene (Peelen & 
Kastner, 2011). Patterns of activation of OSC during this preparatory activity, even 
when considering just cue-only trials, significantly correlated with the localizer pattern 
of the object that had to be detected, leading to the idea that the activity of visual 
areas is modulated already before the scene is presented. An interpretation of these 
43 
 
data is that the instantiation of the search template could determine the pre-
activation of neuronal populations selective for the target category.  
Cluttered visual scenes do not only contain the target of our search, but also and 
generally even more extensively other types of objects, which then act as distractors. 
Further studies address the issue about how different types of distractors are 
encoded in visual areas. One important distinction can be made between objects 
which have already been acting as previous targets, and categories of objects which 
have never been relevant. A study by Seidl compared correlation of patterns elicited 
by categories of objects during localizers and during blocks where they were acting as 
targets, as distractors (objects which had been acting as targets on previous blocks) or 
as irrelevant objects (categories which had never been attended by the subject during 
the experiment) (Seidl, Peelen, & Kastner, 2012). Beyond the enhancement of the 
category information of the target, an additional finding was that, with respect to a 
never relevant category, the distractor showed a reduced level of information in the 
scene. This could be interpreted as the active suppression operated by the visual 
system on the representation of an otherwise too salient category of stimuli. We can 
therefore appreciate an interaction between quality of visual representation and task-
relevance, such that this is enhanced with respect to a neutral baseline if the viewed 
stimulus matches top-down attentional template, and it is suppressed if it does not. 
Patterns of reward 
But then, what if different categories of objects are paired with different levels of 
reward? This was the question underlying a study by Hickey and Peelen, where 
subjects performed a similar category detection task in pictures of outdoor natural 
scenes (Hickey & Peelen, 2015). Each subject had one special category of objects 
among three, the “rewarding” category, which allowed them to earn extra points 
when correctly detected. OSC showed to retain a higher amount of information for 
the category of objects associated with reward with respect to the neutral category, 
when they were both acting as targets. Symmetrically, when they were acting as 
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distractors, there was a stronger suppression of information for the category 
associated with reward than for the neutral one. Reward acts then by further 
increasing representation of the visual category in OSC, when the stimulus matches 
the top-down attentional template. The interaction which we had already seen 
regarding how task-relevance modulates category information holds true even in this 
situation, as the highly represented rewarded category concurrently necessitates a 
higher degree of suppression when acting as distractor. The modulation of category 
information in OSC was correlated with univariate activity across the brain, and a 
series of areas implied in reward processing were found to be predictive of the 
increase in the quality of representation linked to reward, such as left OFC, bilateral 
dlPFC, ACC, inferior and superior parietal lobules, and IFG. Moreover, this correlation 
was also found for an area corresponding to dopaminergic midbrain. As this region 
constituted a special focus of investigation, this was confirmed by more specific and 
compelling analyses. 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, I will present the imaging counterpart of the behavioral 
study from chapter 2. Subjects had to look for cued category of objects in naturalistic 
scenes, and each category was bound to a specific type of motivational feedback. A 
very similar paradigm is presented in chapter 4, apart from the fact that an 
inconsistent schedule of reinforcement is administered in this case. In both studies, 
we subsequently analyzed how this association affected neural representation of 
visual categories through the use of MVPA. Once again we approached our data with 
a valence vs salience hypothesis. Finally, we also performed a univariate analysis of 
the BOLD signal from both experiments, in order to see which regions of the brain 
were found to follow the former or the latter pattern. 
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Chapter 2 
Irrational impact of reward and 
punishment on visual search 
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Abstract 
 
Association of a stimulus with reward determines an increase in the accuracy of its 
perceptual processing, and renders at the same time this stimulus and its associated 
features more attention-drawing. Focus has been put on the origin of this effect, in 
order to ascertain whether it is the product of voluntary, strategic attention, or of an 
automatic, and also potentially counterproductive, bias. Here, we use punishment as a 
tool to decouple these two interacting influences. Subjects detected exemplars of cued 
real-world categories (people, cars, houses and trees) in naturalistic scenes. On a 
motivational level, rewarding and punishing blocks were highly relevant for 
participants, as in both cases correct detection of an exemplar of the cued category 
was 50 times more valuable than in neutral blocks. At the same time this constant 
utility was located in oppositely valenced spaces for these two circumstances, as an 
increase in the gain for rewarding blocks, and a decrease in loss for punishing ones. 
Different outcomes affected search, both in terms of target selection and of 
attentional capture, according to a valence, and not to a salience, pattern, such that 
stimuli associated with loss yielded lower performance and caused less capture than 
the ones associated with gain. We conclude that motivational feedback impacts search 
through an irrational, non-strategic bias. 
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Introduction 
 
Traditional theories of visual attention have always stressed the dichotomy between 
the endogenous, top-down control and the exogenous, bottom-up bias. Nevertheless, 
a growing number of studies is suggesting that goal and physical salience may not be 
the sole actors involved in the process, and that an additional control may take part in 
the course of the deployment of attention (Awh et al., 2012). An important example of 
this phenomenon is given by reward, whose role has been shown to go beyond a 
simple modulation of top-down attentional set. In abstract arrays, reward delivery 
causes priming of target-associated features, even when this happens to be 
counterproductive (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, Hickey et al., 2010a). Attentional 
capture has also been highlighted at the level of ocular movements, especially during 
early stages of the deployment of attention (Hickey & van Zoest, 2012). Moreover, 
similar instances of reward-associated phenomena have recently been demonstrated 
for visual search of real-world object categories in natural scenes. Here, categories of 
objects paired with reward led to a higher degree of attentional capture when acting 
as task-irrelevant distractors in the following trial (Hickey et al., 2015). 
At present, the role of punishment in visual search has been less intensively studied. 
Yet, especially the knowledge about the mutual relationship between the impact of 
these two outcomes could represent a source of important insights into the nature of 
motivational modulation of perception itself. Under an evolutionary point of view, 
both reward and punishment act as signals for stimuli with strong biological 
importance. In this frame, then, their perceptual coding could follow a nonspecific 
affective salience, giving higher value both to rewarding and punishing stimuli with 
respect to neutral ones. This scheme would also represent a convenient solution to the 
problem of attributing value to stimuli, and therefore potentially be the result of 
strategic planning and voluntary attention (Fig. 2.1A). We should underline here that, 
when using the term salience, we are considering it under of a motivational point of 
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view, and not under a perceptual one. On the other hand, coding of these two 
outcomes could follow a valence-based ranking, attributing value to stimuli in an 
ascending fashion from aversive, to neutral, to appetitive ones (Fig. 2.1C). This would 
reflect their incentive value, namely the motivational quality which makes a stimulus 
attractive and desired, thereby guiding selection, attention and approach. Accordingly, 
a punished stimulus would be less wanted than a rewarded and also than a neutral 
one, and consequently be ignored and avoided, although relevant. Both models have a 
counterpart when considering the role of distractors associated with the same types of 
motivational outcomes (Fig. 2.1B and 2.1D). 
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In fact, previous studies in the field of attention gave contradictory results about this 
issue. In some cases, punishment led, similarly to reward, to a predictable increase in 
the visual saliency of the stimulus (Small et al., 2005; Engelmann et al., 2009; Raymond 
& O’Brien, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2015). Other studies found instead a suppression in 
the representation of stimuli paired with this payoff (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Resnik 
et al., 2011; Laufer & Paz, 2012; Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016). 
Fig. 2.1 Predictions from the 
two alternative models. (A) For 
the salience model, both 
reward- and loss-associated 
targets should be more 
strongly represented than 
neutral ones, and (B) they 
should draw more attention 
when acting as task-irrelevant 
distractors. (C) According to the 
valence model, targets 
associated with reward should 
be more strongly represented 
than loss-associated targets. 
(D) Conversely, distractors 
associated with reward should 
require stronger attentional 
suppression than distractors 
associated with punishment.  
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A particularly intriguing result was given by the study of Raymond and O’Brien (2009). 
Here, novel face stimuli were imbued with different values of expected value (EV), 
namely a gain or a loss. Then, recognition of these same faces was measured in a 
paradigm which made use of the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon (Raymond et al., 
1992). When attentional resources were not constrained, then recognition of these 
faces followed a salience model. Crucially, when attentional resources were not fully 
available, recognition of these faces also followed a valence model, such that stimuli 
associated with reward did not show any effect of AB, while stimuli associated with 
loss did. 
 
 
In the current study, we use a category detection task to test this valence vs salience 
hypothesis. Participants looked for cued target categories (people, cars, houses and 
trees) in real-world scenes (Fig. 2.2), and received different types of feedback 
(rewarding, neutral or punishing) across blocks (Fig. 2.3A). In rewarding and punishing 
blocks, successful detection of a target category had a static relative value of +100 
points. Nevertheless, this constant amount was located in a positively valenced space 
for rewarding blocks (+150 for correct vs +50 for incorrect) and in a negatively 
valenced one for punishing blocks (-50 vs -150). In neutral blocks, instead, correct 
target detection had a relatively negligible value of only +2 points (+1 vs -1) (2.3B). We 
analyzed our behavioral measures to test whether they displayed to follow the valence 
pattern, the salience one, or a combination of the two. 
 
Fig. 2.2 Examples of naturalistic scenes employed for the visual search task. 
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Materials and methods 
 
Participants.  
105 participants (79 female, mean age 23 ± 4.1 SD) took part in the experiment. All 
procedures were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and were 
approved by the ethical committee of the University of Trento. 2 participants were 
excluded from the analyses, as frequency of their responses was 2.5 SD lower than the 
mean of the population, and another one was excluded as his conditional accuracy 
measures differed more than 3 SD from the mean of the population. Finally, 1 
participant was excluded because of inconsistent responses on a personality 
questionnaire. 
 
Fig. 2.3 (A) Trial structure. Subjects reported the presence of a cued target category in the scene. 
(B) Structure of the experiment: changing categories (cars and trees), in which payoff schedules 
were alternating, were always followed by constant categories (people and houses), which always 
maintained a neutral feedback.  
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Stimuli.  
The stimulus set for the visual search task consisted of black and white pictures (27° × 
38° visual angle) of natural scenes (n=384) selected from an online database (Russell et 
al., 2008). Four groups of pictures, each made up of 48 scenes, contained all categories 
but one. Other six groups contained all the various possible combinations of two 
categories. Four of these groups contained 32 pictures, while the “car-tree” and the 
“people-house” group contained 24 pictures. Natural scene photographs were 
followed by perceptual masks of equal size, generated by combining white noise at 
different spatial frequencies and superimposing naturalistic structure on the noise 
(Walther, Caddigan, Fei-Fei, Beck, 2009). Stimuli were presented using the 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
Procedure.  
The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated room. Participants were presented 
with stimuli on a CRT monitor (51° × 65° visual angle) and asked to report the presence 
or absence of a category of objects via keyboard button presses (respectively, through 
“b” and “m” key). Each trial started with a fixation cross (833 ms) followed by the brief 
presentation of the scene (40 ms), a mask (250 ms), the reappearance of fixation (300 
ms), and the feedback (533 ms; Fig. 2.3A). Participants reported the presence of the 
target category with the right index finger response and its absence with the right 
middle finger response. Responses given outside the 300 ms fixation interval, or 
absence of response, garnered an incorrect performance.  
In each trial, feedback depended on block type (rewarding, punishing or neutral), trial 
type (target-present or target-absent) and correctness of response. We used two 
slightly different payoff matrices across subjects, which are both shown in Fig. 2.4. For 
the first 55 subjects, scores followed the matrix shown in fig. 2.4A. In rewarding blocks, 
subjects received, in target-present trials, 150 points for correct response, and only 50 
points in case of incorrect response. In target-absent trials, they lost 0 points for 
correct response and 50 points for incorrect response. In punishing blocks, subjects 
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lost, in target-present trials, 50 points for correct response, and a greater amount of 
150 points in case of incorrect response. In target-absent trials, they lost 0 points for 
correct response and 50 points for incorrect response. For neutral targets, points were 
+1 for correct and -1 for incorrect response, both for target-present and for target-
absent trials. Payoff matrix for the last 46 subjects is shown in fig. 2.4B. The only 
difference here regarded target-present trials in rewarding and punishing blocks. 
Correct detection of rewarded targets yielded 100 points, and failure to do so 0 points, 
while correct detection of punished targets determined loss of 0 points, and failure to 
do so the loss of 100 points. Statistical analysis demonstrated no difference in 
performance across these groups (for all effects involving this difference, p > 0.211), so 
results were collapsed and are presented together. 
 
Participants performed 48 blocks of 16 trials each. Before each block started, a display 
was presented until subject response, indicating the target and the type of feedback 
for that block and the score which had been obtained up to that moment. For two 
categories (cars and trees, “changing categories”), the type of feedback was changing 
Fig. 2.4 Trial outcome depended on block type, presence of the target and correctness of response. 
Two payoff matrices were used in the experiment. (A) Payoff matrix used with the first 55 subjects 
and (B) with the last 46 subjects. 
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among the three motivational conditions, while for the other two (people and houses, 
“constant categories”) feedback was always neutral. These two types of categories 
were alternating, so that a changing category always preceded a constant category (Fig 
3C). Each block contained 8 target present and 8 target absent trials: in both cases, 4 
trials presented three-category scenes, and the remaining 4 trials presented two-
category scenes. The total amount of trials was 768 per subject, so that each scene 
was shown twice. At the end of the task, each subject was administered a BIS/BAS 
scale questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994). Participants were paid based on the 
number of points accumulated during the experiment. 
Data Analysis.  
Two categories of objects – the ‘changing categories’ - (cars and trees), had shifting 
types of outcome, while the other two – the ‘constant categories’ - (people and 
houses), always had a neutral feedback. Changing and constant categories were 
alternating. Accuracy values for detection of changing categories were used as a 
measure of the direct effect of feedback on target selection (Fig. 2.5A). For constant 
categories, the crucial element was represented by the target of the previous block, a 
changing category which could have either been positively conditioned, negatively 
conditioned or none of the two. We then looked at how much this category disrupted 
search in the subsequent block, as a function of the type of feedback received. 
Accuracy measures for distractor-absent and distractor-present trials were calculated, 
separately for post-rewarding, post-neutral and post-punishment blocks, and the 
distractor-absent measure was subsequently subtracted from the distractor-present 
one. This procedure yielded three values, one per motivational condition (Fig. 2.5B). 
The same type of analysis was performed on RT measures (Fig. 2.6). 
Finally, the six behavioral values, three for target selection and three for attentional 
capture, were modeled using two predictors: a former one accounting for a valence-
based model of targets and distractors [+1 0 -1 -1 0 +1], and a latter one accounting for 
a salience-based model [+1 -2 +1 -1 +2 -1]. Values were standardized by computing the 
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z-score for each vector, so that the first vector became [+1.12 0 -1.12 -1.12 0 +1.12], 
and the second one [0.6455   -1.2910    0.6455   -0.6455    1.2910   -0.6455]. Notice 
that, for each vector, distractor values are simply the opposite of the target values. 
Moreover, the vectors used for the RT analysis had opposite directionality with respect 
to the ones used for accuracy (therefore [+1 0 -1 -1 0 +1] for valence and so on), 
because of the inverse relationship expected in this case. This yielded one beta 
coefficient per subject per model. For each model, all the beta coefficients were then t 
tested against zero, to see which model could correctly fit the data. Finally, the 
salience model beta values were subtracted from the valence model beta values 
individually for each subject, and the resulting differences were again t tested against 
zero to make a direct comparison between the two models. Planned post-hoc 
comparisons were one-tailed paired sample t-tests. Effect sizes have been evaluated 
according to Cohen (1988). 
 
 
Results 
 
As explained above, the analysis focused on accuracy measures obtained both for 
changing and for constant categories. Automatic effects of reward on attention have 
been shown to exhibit primarily through a change in RT, while levels of accuracy would 
also reflect the change in the speed-accuracy tradeoff as operated by conscious effort 
(Bijleveld et al., 2010). We wanted to test the hypothesis that the effect on RT could be 
resistant to top-down strategies. Consequently, we gave participants very tight time 
windows to respond, so that relevant changes in RT would reflect in parallel 
differences in accuracy measures, affecting as a consequence monetary payoff. 
Therefore, if subjects were in control of this tendency they could have tried to adjust 
their speed-accuracy tradeoff correspondingly, in order to optimize performance. 
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For changing categories, mean accuracy values for the three motivational conditions 
were taken into account (Fig. 2.5A). For constant categories, we evaluated the degree 
of attentional capture exerted by previous target during search for constant 
categories, as a function of the type of motivational feedback received (Fig. 2.5B). We 
then regressed the six values coming out of this analysis with a valence and a salience 
model, to determine which could best fit the data. Behavioral measures followed a 
valence pattern.  
 
Coefficients corresponding to the valence model were positive (t(100) = 4.219, p < 
10¯5, Cohen’s U3 = 0.322) while coefficients corresponding to the salience model were 
negative (t(100) = -1.693,  p = 0.093, Cohen’s U3 = 0.535), reflecting an inverse 
relationship between the model and experimental results (and thus a very bad fit). 
Also the direct comparison between the two models yielded a positive result (t(100) = 
3.969, p < 10¯⁴, Cohen’s U3 = 0.356). Follow-up contrasts showed that accuracy of 
detection of categories associated with reward was higher than accuracy measures for 
the ones associated with loss (t(100) = 4.820, p < 10¯6, Cohen’s d = 0.480), and that 
search for a neutral constant category was disrupted more by a reward-associated 
Fig. 2.5 (A) Accuracy measures for the changing categories. In line with the valence model, accuracy 
is better for reward-associated targets than for loss-associated targets. (B) This is paralleled at the 
level of attentional capture, so that categories of objects paired with reward determine a larger 
decrease in accuracy than categories paired with loss. Error bars reflect within-subject standard 
error. 
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distractor than by a loss-associated distractor (t(100) = 1.712, p = 0.045, Cohen’s d =  -
0.170). 
We subsequently analyzed RT measures in order to detect any potential effects of 
speed-accuracy tradeoff. For the target effect, we looked at the mean RT for the three 
changing categories (Fig. 2.6A). For the distractor effect, we evaluated the RT cost of 
previous target during search for constant categories, as a function of the type of 
received feedback (Fig. 2.6B). We subsequently treated the six values in the same way 
as we did with accuracy measures.  
 
Again, we found positive coefficients for the valence model (t(100) = 4.945, p < 10¯6, 
Cohen’s U3 = 0.277), and negative coefficients for the salience model (t(100) = -3.452, 
p < 10¯⁴, Cohen’s U3 = 0.634). Finally, we found positive coefficients for the direct 
comparison between the two (t(100) = 5.498, p_<_10¯7, Cohen’s U3 = 0.247). Follow-
up contrasts showed that RT for detection of categories associated with reward was 
shorter than RT for categories associated with loss (t(100) = 6.792, p < 10¯10, Cohen’s d 
= -0.592), while the same comparison at the distractor level showed no difference 
between the two values (t(100) = 0.933 p = 0.177, Cohen’s d = 0.093). In sum, the 
impact of the different motivational outcomes on RT were not suggestive of a speed-
Fig. 2.6 (A) RT measures for the changing categories. In line with the valence model, RT are longer 
for reward-associated targets than for loss-associated targets. (B) At the distractor level, no 
difference is present between the two conditions. Error bars reflect within-subject standard error. 
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accuracy tradeoff which could explain the effects on accuracy, but rather (only at the 
target level) had the same directionality of those effects. Participants had a limited 
time for response, which means that two different types of errors were possible: 
explicit errors, where participants incorrectly reported the presence or absence of the 
target, and time-out errors, where they failed to respond in time. The presence of 
time-out trials renders this study unsuitable for an analysis in the framework of signal 
detection theory. At the same time, a more detailed examination can consider target 
present and target absent trials separately, also in order to understand whether the 
results that we find derive from a specific condition. We performed this analysis only 
for changing blocks, as these are the ones where a strategic approach of participants 
towards different types of outcomes could have been used (although our payoff matrix 
was specifically designed to equate the two salient conditions, reward and 
punishment, in terms of their strategic value). Both for target present and target 
absent trials, we calculated explicit accuracy, namely the amount of correct responses 
over the total amount or explicit responses (excluding therefore time out trials). 
Results are shown in Fig. 2.7. Data for explicit accuracy in target present trials followed 
a valence (t(100) = 3.176, p_= 0.002, Cohen’s U3 = 0.361),  but also a salience pattern 
(t(100) = 2.605, p_= 0.011), Cohen’s U3 = 0.416),  and follow-up contrasts revealed that 
participants responded significantly better to rewarding targets than to punishing ones 
(t(100) = 3.176, p_= 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.623), and also better to rewarding targets 
than to neutral ones (t(100) = 4.030, p_<_10¯5, Cohen’s d = 0.331) (Fig. 2.7A). On the 
contrary, explicit accuracy in target absent trials did not follow either a valence (t(100) 
= 0.698, p_= 0.486, Cohen’s U3 = 0.564), nor a salience pattern (t(100) = 1.367, p_= 
0.175, Cohen’s U3 = 0.386) (Fig. 2.7B). 
Also the number of time-outs in target present trials was found to follow a valence 
(t(100) = 5.570, p_<_10-7, Cohen’s U3 = 0.307) but not a salience model (t(100) = -
3.535, p_<_10-4; Cohen’s U3 = 0.648; again, negative values mean inverse relationship 
with the model), and the amount of time-outs was significantly higher in the loss 
condition than in the reward one (t(100) = 5.570, p_<_10-6, Cohen’s d = -0.554) (Fig. 
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2.7C). Finally, the number of time-outs in target absent trials was found to follow a 
valence (t(100) = 2.476, p_= 0.015, Cohen’s U3 = 0.436) and not a salience model 
(t(100) = -6.067, p_< 10-8; Cohen’s U3 = 0.823). Follow-up contrasts revealed that the 
number of time-outs for this condition was significantly lower in rewarding blocks than 
in punishing blocks (t(100) = 2.476, p_= 0.015, Cohen’s d = -0.246), but at the same 
time this measure was lower in neutral blocks both than in rewarding blocks (t(100) = 
3.981, p_<_10-3, Cohen’s d = 0.396) and in punishing ones (t(100) = 6.111, p_<_10-7, 
Cohen’s d = -0.608) (Fig. 2.7D). 
In sum, while for target-present trials the valence pattern was present both at level of 
explicit accuracy and of time-out trials, target-absent trials showed a different pattern.  
In this case, while no difference between conditions was present at the level of explicit 
accuracy, data for time-outs showed both a valence and an inverse salience scheme. 
The lack of an inverse relationship between patterns of response in target-present and 
target-absent trials shows that the compound accuracy results are not the product of a 
shift in response bias, but rather of an effect which is present for target-present, but 
not for target-absent trials (or, more precisely, only at the level of time-outs in this 
latter case). 
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Fig. 2.7 (A) Explicit accuracy when the target was present. This analysis is based on trials where 
participants made an overt response within the 600 ms time limit following stimulus onset. (B) 
Explicit accuracy when the target was absent. (C) Number of trials where participants failed to 
respond within the 600 ms time limit (time-outs) when the target was present, expressed as a 
percentage of total trials per condition. (D) Time-outs when the target was absent. 
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Discussion 
 
This study investigates the mutual relationship between the impact of reward and 
punishment on visual attention, and, more precisely, whether this relationship follows 
a valence or a salience pattern. The answer to this specific question may help shed 
light onto more general mechanisms underpinning motivational modulation of 
perception. Previous research has already aimed at disentangling the automatic 
component of the influence of reward on perception from the one due to the strategic 
allocation of attention. This was achieved by examining how stimuli previously paired 
with reward affected search not only when they were actively selected, but also when 
they acted as task-irrelevant distractors (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, Hickey et al., 
2010; Hickey et al., 2015a; Anderson et al., 2011). The use of punishment in this 
experiment provides us with another important tool in order to decouple strategic 
from automatic components of attention. In fact, we find that behavioral measures of 
target selection follow a valence-like pattern, an apparently paradoxical scheme. If 
participants were to be rational, a salience-like approach to the task would have 
resulted in a more convenient payoff, given the higher amount of points earned 
through correct detection of targets in rewarding and punishing blocks with respect to 
neutral ones. This pattern is also mirrored by measures of attentional capture, such 
that punished stimuli are the ones which draw less attention when acting as 
distractors. 
These data support the concept that motivational modulation of perception does not 
entirely result from a deliberate allocation of resources. In this frame, then, the way in 
which also reward affects not only attentional capture, but even target selection, could 
similarly derive from a largely involuntary bias. The potential for a dissociation 
between endogenous and volitional control has already been the focus of a series of 
studies about thought suppression, stemming from the so-called white bear 
phenomenon (Wegner et al., 1987). More recently, Awh and colleagues have 
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summarized situations where this type of conflict takes place at the level of visual 
selection. In order to solve this apparent discrepancy, they posit an alternative 
framework which takes into account three distinct categories of attentional controls: 
one due to physical salience, another one considering current top-down attentional 
set, and finally a third one bound to past selection history (Awh, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2012). This last category would comprise simple search history bias, like for 
example priming of pop-out, and also involuntary biases of attention due to reward. 
Moreover, it would also encompass some instances of perceptual learning such as 
contextual cueing. All of these three phenomena are expressions of implicit memory, 
which could therefore represent a critical component of this new, alternative control. 
Many questions remain about the matter. First of all, we have cited studies which 
report that reward and punishment have been shown to affect behavior in a similar or 
an opposing manner depending on the type of task, and sometimes depending also on 
the specifics of the task. An open question would therefore concern the variables 
which determine which is going to be the scheme which shapes behavior. One 
interesting perspective could regard the memory system involved in the task. A 
particularly enlightening example is furnished to this aim by the study of Raymond and 
O’Brien (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). Here, recognition of briefly presented faces, 
imbued with different outcome values, was subsequently tested with and without 
constraints of attention. Previous studies have shown that distraction is able to bias 
the competition between different memory systems, namely the implicit and the 
explicit one, and consequently modulate the degree to which performance in a task 
relies on the former or on the latter system for its execution (Foerde et al., 2006). 
Critically, in Raymond’s study, recognition followed the salience model in the full-
attention condition, and the valence model in the constrained attention condition. As 
underlined before, many characteristics of our paradigm pushed it toward an implicit 
mode of execution, from the tight temporal limits available for response to the fact 
that category detection in naturalistic scenes relies on highly trained, experience-
based skills. Could then the implicit memory system be linked to this irrational, 
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automatic valence pattern, and the explicit system be instead driven by a strategically 
more convenient salience model? 
Another important variable which could determine whether a valence or a salience 
scheme shapes attention is the type of aversive stimulus under consideration. For 
example, some of the studies which highlighted a salience type of pattern were using 
primary punishments such as electrical shocks (Schmidt et al., 2015). In our study we 
make instead use of monetary compensation, with a change in the nature and most 
likely also in the intensity of the threat. Thus, it would be important to distinguish 
whether the aversive stimulus evokes a feeling of actual fear or anxiety or rather a 
blunter one of discomfort or disgust. It could be possible that the former situation 
would lead to a shift from an uneven prioritization of rewarding stimuli to a more 
balanced bias towards all motivationally salient elements. In this case, such 
modulation of attention evoked by aversive stimuli could also have a separate origin, 
as posited by the theory of emotional attention (Brosch et al., 2011). 
Another relevant issue, which is also critically connected to the previous ones, regards 
the neural mechanisms involved in the process. We know that dopamine release may 
provide the signal which allows priming of reward-associated stimuli. Theories exist 
about where and how this signal is implemented, but no definite answer has been 
drawn about the matter. In the case that the winner of the competition between 
memory systems defined the pattern characterizing deployment of attention, then the 
identification of the areas involved in each condition could clearly shed light first of all 
onto the specific issue of how different motivational outcomes are able to differently 
modulate perception. But secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this could also help 
understanding the way in which dopamine signal is transformed into incentive 
salience. 
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Chapter 3 
Neural representation of conditioned 
stimuli in occipito-temporal cortex 
during naturalistic search follows 
valence, not salience 
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Abstract 
 
During visual search in natural scenes, attention to a category of visual stimuli can be 
indexed in multi-voxel patterns of fMRI activity in occipito-temporal cortex. Encoding 
of a reward-associated category is enhanced with respect to a neutral one, and it is 
unclear whether this reflects a bias toward the positive valence of the stimulus or a 
broader prioritization of motivationally relevant stimuli. Here we test these two 
alternative hypotheses. Our task was such that correct detection of reward- and 
punishment-associated targets had the same relative value (100 points), but detection 
of a reward-associated target resulted in the receipt of 150 points (vs. 50 points for 
incorrect performance) whereas detection of a punishment-associated target resulted 
in the loss of 50 points (vs. the loss of 150 points for incorrect performance). We had 
two expectations: if selection is driven by the value of prior outcome, participants 
should preferentially encode reward-associated stimuli (valence model). However, if 
resources are deployed to stimuli that are motivationally relevant, reward-predictive 
and loss-predictive stimuli should be equally represented (salience model). We found 
that the amount of information for the different visual categories in occipito-temporal 
cortex followed the valence, and not the salience, pattern. Moreover, stimulus-evoked 
activity in the dopaminergic midbrain predicted the quality of these representations. 
At the same time, posterior parietal cortex was also found to encode information 
about attended categories, but this time following the latter of our expectations, 
namely the salience pattern. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last few years, MVPA has proven to represent a powerful tool in order to 
investigate brain activation during visual search in naturalistic, cluttered environments. 
More specifically, object selective visual cortex (OSC) has shown to retain information 
about the high-level categories of objects that a subject is actively looking for, and to 
suppress information about salient, but task-irrelevant, distractors (Peelen et al., 2009; 
Seidl et al., 2012). Recent work has also demonstrated that this categorical visual 
representation is additionally modulated by motivational outcome, such that pairing a 
real-world category with reward acts by relatively increasing the amount of 
information about that category in the occipito-temporal cortical region of interest. 
Conversely, its representation is more strongly inhibited with respect to a neutral one, 
when this category turns to act as a distractor (Hickey & Peelen, 2015). 
Our study stems on one side from this existing literature regarding how MVPA is able 
to assess visual representation during search, and on the other side from the results of 
an experiment that we have recently performed, which looked at how reward and 
punishment could impact behavioral measures during search in natural scenes 
(Chapter 2). We had made the two alternative hypotheses that these motivational 
outcomes affected search in a similar or in an opposing manner, namely according to a 
salience or a valence pattern, respectively. We found that accuracy measures followed, 
both for target selection and for attentional capture, the scheme which was less 
expected in terms of its strategic utility, namely the valence one, suggesting therefore 
a bias toward this pattern of behavior. In this fMRI study, we aim at bridging the gap 
between these two lines of study. On one side, we use this technique in order to 
better elucidate the neural mechanisms of an unexpected behavioral finding. On the 
other, we mean to extend previous results regarding the influence of motivational 
outcomes on category information in OSC. The relevance of this question lies on the 
idea that the increase in representation that we see for reward could come from 
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different origins (Maunsell, 2004). On one hand, it could derive from the higher utility 
value that an object paired with reward retains, possibly resulting in a higher degree of 
voluntary attention deployed to the task. In this case, a similar motivational role would 
be played by an equally valuable evasion of loss. But on the other hand, it could reflect 
the incentive properties that reward attributes to an object, increasing its desirability 
and attractiveness. In this case, an object consistently paired with loss would show a 
relationship with reward which is exactly the opposite with respect to the one that we 
have just considered (Fig. 3.1). 
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To this aim, we employed a visual search paradigm where participants had to detect 
examples of four categories of objects (people, cars, houses and trees) in pictures of 
naturalistic scenes (Fig. 3.2A). The target category changed blockwise, with the other 
three categories acting as task-irrelevant distractors in all of the scenes of the block. 
For each subject, one of the four categories was associated with monetary gain, one 
with monetary loss, and two with a neutral outcome (Fig. 3.2B). Correct detection of 
the rewarding category resulted in the receipt of 150 points, while failure to do so 
Fig. 3.1 Predictions from the 
salience and the valence 
models. (A) For the salience 
model, both reward- and loss-
associated targets should be 
more strongly represented 
than neutral ones, and (B) they 
should draw more attention 
when acting as task-irrelevant 
distractors. (C) According to the 
valence model, targets 
associated with reward should 
be more strongly represented 
than neutral ones, but loss-
associated targets should be 
less so. (D) Correspondingly, 
distractors associated with 
reward should require stronger 
attentional suppression than 
distractors associated with 
punishment.  
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resulted in receipt of only 50 points. For the punishing category, correct detection 
determined the loss of 50 points, but incorrect performance caused instead a greater 
loss of 150 points. Finally, neutral categories garnered only 1 point when correctly 
detected, and failure to do so resulted in the loss of only 1 point. Net value of correct 
detection of rewarding and punishing categories was therefore equally relevant (100 
points), with respect to the negligible value of neutral categories (2 points).  
We then looked at how different motivational outcomes affected category information 
on one side for categories acting as targets, and for categories acting as distractors. 
Once again, we approached our data considering two alternative models, the valence 
and the salience models, that could have possibly shaped the deployment of attention. 
We subsequently tested the hypothesis that dopamine released by the midbrain could 
be related to motivational modulation of information in OSC. Thirdly, we looked for 
areas of the brain which could discriminate between the categories which were 
attended across blocks. Finally, we performed an exploratory whole-brain univariate 
analysis, in order to see which areas of the brain were activated according to our 
contrasts of interest during the execution of this task. 
 
 
Materials and methods 
 
Participants.  
Twenty-four participants (9 female, mean age 24.5 ± 4.1 SD) took part in the 
experiment. All procedures were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki and were approved by the ethical committee of the University of Trento. One 
participant was excluded from the analyses because of low performance (d’ = 0.05). 
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General structure of the experiment.  
The experiment consisted of three different parts: 1) the OSC localizer, 2) the category 
pattern localizer, and 3) the visual search task. For all three phases, stimuli were 
presented using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) and projected on a translucent screen 
at the end of the scanner bore. Participants viewed the screen through a mirror 
 
Fig. 3.2 (A) Examples of real-world scenes employed for the search task. (B) Feedback schedule. 
One category was paired with reward, one with punishment and the other two with a neutral 
feedback. Associations were counterbalanced across subjects. Feedback for each trial depended 
on category type, category presence and correctness of response. (C) Examples of whole and 
scattered object images for the OSC Localizer.  
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mounted on the head coil. At the end of the MR session, each subject was 
administered a BIS/BAS scale questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994). Participants were 
paid based on the number of points accumulated during the experiment. 
OSC localizer.  
Stimuli. The stimulus set for the OSC Localizer consisted of black and white pictures 
(27° × 38° visual angle) of 20 daily-life objects (e.g. telephone, cheese, alarm clock) and 
their scrambled version (Fig. 3.2C). 
Procedure. Participants performed 2 runs of OSC localizers of 317 s duration, each 
containing 16 blocks of 20 trials and 3 fixation blocks. Each run began and ended with 
15 sec fixation. Before the first block of the run, a 2 s display reminded the task to the 
subject. During each 15 s block, pictures of one type only (intact or scrambled) were 
presented, while subjects monitored for image repetition, which occurred once in a 
block. Each trial started with a fixation cross (350 ms) followed by the picture of the 
intact or scrambled object (400 ms). Every fifth block was a 15 s fixation block with no 
stimuli. 
Category pattern localizer. 
Stimuli. The stimulus set for the category localizer consisted of four groups of stimuli, 
one for each of the categories cued in the visual search task (people, cars, houses and 
trees). Each group consisted of 40 black and white pictures (27° × 38° visual angle) of 
isolated exemplars of the same category on a white background. Pictures of people 
were headless, as faces in the search task scenes were generally too small to be 
visually solved. 
Procedure. Participants performed 2 runs of category localizers of 392 s duration, each 
containing 20 blocks of 20 trials and 4 fixation blocks. Each run began and ended with 
15 sec fixation. Before the first block of the run, a 2 s display reminded the task to the 
subject. During each 15 s block, pictures of different exemplars of only one of the four 
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categories were presented, while subjects monitored for image repetition, which 
occurred once in a block. Each trial started with a fixation cross (350 ms) followed by 
the picture of the intact or scrambled object (400 ms). Every fifth block was a 15 s 
fixation block with no stimuli.  
Visual search task.  
Stimuli. The stimulus set for the visual search task consisted of black and white pictures 
(27° × 38° visual angle) of natural scenes (n=384) selected from an online database 
(Russell et al., 2008). 192 pictures contained all four categories (people, cars, houses 
and trees), and the remaining 192 were organized into four groups (n=48), each one 
containing three out of four categories. Natural scene photographs were followed by 
perceptual masks of equal size, generated by combining white noise at different spatial 
frequencies and superimposing naturalistic structure on the noise (Walther et al., 
2009).  
Procedure. Participants performed 4 runs of 590 s duration, each containing 8 blocks of 
60 s. Each run began and ended with 15 sec fixation. Before each block started, a 
display was presented for 10 s, indicating the target of that block, and the score which 
had been obtained up to that moment. Each of the four categories acted as target 
twice per run, and order of target types within a run was counterbalanced across runs. 
Each block contained 12 trials where target was present (pictures containing all four 
categories), and 12 trials where target was absent (pictures containing all the 
categories but the target) in a randomized order. The total amount of trials was 768 
per subjects, so that each scene was shown twice. Each trial started with a fixation 
cross (833 ms) followed by the brief presentation of the scene (58 ms), a mask (325 
ms), the reappearance of fixation (750 ms), and the feedback (533 ms; Fig. 3.3A). 
Participants reported the presence of the target category with the right index finger 
response and its absence with the right middle finger response. Responses given 
outside of the 750 ms fixation interval, or absence of response, garnered an incorrect 
performance. Feedback for each trial depended on type of target (rewarded, punished 
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or neutral), type of trial (target present or target absent) and correctness of response 
(Fig. 3.2B). For neutral targets, points were +1 for correct and -1 for incorrect response 
both for target present and for target absent trials. For rewarding blocks, subjects 
received +150 points for correct, and +50 for incorrect response in target present 
trials, +0 for correct and -50 for incorrect response in target absent trials. For punishing 
blocks, subjects got -50 points for correct and -150 for incorrect response in target 
present trials, and +0 for correct and -50 for incorrect response in target absent trials. 
For each participant, in a counterbalanced order, one category was paired with 
reward, one with punishment, and the remaining two categories were neutral. 
fMRI Data Acquisition.  
Imaging was conducted on a Brucker BioSpin MedSpec 4T head scanner (Bruker 
BioSpin), equipped with an eight-channel head coil. T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-
planar images were collected as functional volumes for all the functional runs (EPI; 
repetition time = 2.2 s, echo time = 33 ms, flip angle = 76°, 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxel size, 
0.45 mm gap, 31 slices, 192 mm field of view, 64 × 64 matrix size). A T1-weighted 
image (MPRAGE; 1 × 1 × 1 mm voxel size; 256 slices, 224 × 176 matrix size) was 
obtained as a high-resolution anatomical reference. 
fMRI Preprocessing.  
All neuroimaging data were analyzed using MATLAB and SPM12. The volumes were 
motion corrected, slice time corrected, coregistered to the structural image and 
spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template (as 
included in SPM12). Functional volumes were then smoothed using a 6-mm full-width 
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. All analyses were performed on the smoothed data. 
fMRI Data Analysis.  
A separate general linear model (GLM) was created for each of the three phases. The 
blood-oxygen-level-dependent signal of each voxel in each participant was modeled  
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Fig. 3.3. (A) Trial structure. Subjects reported the presence of a cued target category in the scene. 
(B) Data Analysis. Patterns from the different search task blocks were correlated with category 
localizers’ patterns. In each case, correlation of the scene both with target and with distractor 
categories were calculated. (C) This yielded a matrix were values along the diagonal index degree of 
correlation of the scenes with the different targets. Along a column (framed in green), we see the 
correlation of the scene with the target categories (framed in red), and with the three distractor 
categories. For each category, degree of correlation with the scene when acting as a distractor is 
calculated by averaging the value obtained in the two neutral blocks (framed in blue). 
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using two regressors of interest in the OSC localizer, one for intact and one for 
scrambled objects. Four regressors of interest representing the various categories 
(people, cars, houses and trees) were used both in the category localizer and in the 
visual search task, in the former case indicating the block type and in the latter the 
block target. In all these cases each regressor spanned a whole block. A second GLM 
was estimated for the search task phase, which considered target-present and target-
absent trials separately for each block, leading therefore to eight regressors of 
interest, two per category. Finally, a third GLM considered correct and incorrect trials 
separately, yielding sixteen regressors of interest, four per category. In all models, six 
additional regressors of no interest obtained from the realignment procedure were 
included to account for head motion. All models also presented an intrinsic temporal 
high-pass filter of 1/128 HZ to correct for slow scanner drifts. 
ROI definition.  
OSC was functionally defined in each participant by contrasting, within occipito-
temporal regions, responses evoked in the intact and in the scrambled condition (p < 
0.001, uncorrected). Mean OSC size was 1491 voxels ± 845 SD. ROI was created using 
the MarsBar Toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). 
MVPA. 
All pattern analyses were performed using CoSMo-MVPA (Oosterhof, Connolly, & 
Haxby, 2016). For each subject, four patterns (one for each object category) were 
obtained from the category localizer, and another four patterns (one for each target 
type) from the visual search task. This was done by extracting t values of each voxel for 
each condition (obtained from the first GLM, with regressors spanning the whole 
block), only for voxels comprised in the ROI of each subject. Following existing work, t 
values were normalized by subtracting, for each voxel, the mean value obtained for 
that voxel across all conditions of the single task. Normalized t values of all four 
conditions from the category localizer were then correlated with all four conditions of 
the visual search task, across all voxels of the ROI (Fig. 3.3B). This yielded a 4 × 4 
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correlation matrix, whose values were then Fisher-transformed and organized in terms 
of whether the category for that block was acting as a target or as a distractor (Fig. 
3.3C). Each category was acting as distractor in three different blocks, but, for the 
distractor measure, we only considered values obtained in the neutral blocks. This was 
done to have a common baseline (neutral targets), where we would measure category 
information for distractors of different motivational conditions in a consistent frame. 
Still, there is no change in results if a mean of all three blocks where category is acting 
as a distractor is used for the same measure. Target and distractor values for the two 
neutral categories were then averaged in each subject, resulting in a 2 × 3 (task 
relevance × motivational condition) matrix (Fig. 3.5). 
Statistical Analysis.  
In order to see which model could best fit the data, we performed a multiple linear 
regression separately for each subject, with the two models of our main hypotheses as 
regressors, plus an additional regressor accounting for task relevance. The 6 MVPA 
values representing a) the different targets (rewarded neutral punished) and b) the 
different distractors (same order) were modeled using the following predictors: one 
accounting for a valence-based model of targets and distractors [+1 0 -1 -1 0 +1], a 
second one accounting for a salience-based one [+1 -2 +1 -1 +2 -1], and a third one 
accounting for task relevance [1 1 1 -1 -1 -1]. Values were standardized for each vector, 
so that the first vector would become [+1.12 0 -1.12 -1.12 0 +1.12], et cetera. Note 
that, for each vector, distractor values are simply the opposite of the target values. 
This yielded one beta coefficient per subject per model. For each model, all the beta 
coefficients were then t tested against zero, to see which model could correctly fit the 
data. Finally, the salience model beta values were subtracted from the valence model 
beta values individually for each subject, and the resulting differences were again t 
tested against zero to make a direct comparison between the two models. We used 
the same approach to analyze behavioral data, but using three digits vectors this time, 
as no measure was present for a distractor-related effect. All statistical values reported 
in the paper are a product of permutation analysis. For tests against the null 
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hypothesis of zero, data-driven distributions were generated by randomly sampling 
from the relevant dataset 10,000 times with replacement. The likelihood of observed 
data given the null was calculated through comparison of observed data to these 
distributions. Planned comparisons were achieved by treating difference scores the 
same way. 
Correlation between univariate activity and information.  
T values from the second GLM, which considered target-present and target-absent 
trials separately, were used for this analysis, focusing on target-present trials only. For 
each subject, a single t value was calculated for a valence [+1 0 -1], and another one 
for a salience [+1 -2 +1] contrast of the mean univariate activity during the visual 
search task, for two ROIs, one corresponding to SN and the other one to Red Nucleus 
(Fig. 3.5A). For this regression we only considered targets, as all distractors were 
always present in all the scenes of each block type, and therefore no differential 
analysis could be conducted among them within each search task condition for 
univariate activity. Individual t values of both contrasts were then correlated with the 
individual beta coefficients of the multiple linear regression of OSC category 
information modulation of the corresponding model. The regression was similar to the 
one described for the main analysis, but again only value for targets were considered 
(because of the different analysis performed on univariate activity). Correlation values 
of these two regions were then compared through Steiger’s test, which takes into 
account the degree of correlation between the two variables not shared in the two 
previous tests, i.e. univariate activity of SN and Red Nucleus. Regions were 
anatomically defined through WFU PickAtlas, a software which is based on the 
Talairach Daemon database (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). 
Searchlight analysis.  
The searchlight analysis tested for regions that discriminated between the four targets 
based on the category localizer patterns. For each voxel in the brain, we computed 
voxelwise correlations in a sphere of 21-mm radius around this voxel. The correlation 
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values from each sphere were Fisher transformed and assigned to the center voxel of 
this sphere. The average correlation between matching categories was contrasted with 
the average correlation between nonmatching categories. These net values were 
computed for each voxel separately, and then t tested across subjects. The threshold 
was set to P < 0.001 (uncorrected) and a minimum cluster size of 50 voxels. 
Univariate analysis. 
The regressors of the correct target-present trials of the four motivational categories 
[reward neutral1 neutral2 punishment] were contrasted according to the valence [+1 0 
0 -1] and to the salience [+1 -1 -1 +1] pattern. Individual participants’ contrast images 
entered a second level t-test (threshold set at P < 0.001, cluster corrected for multiple-
comparisons, minimum cluster size of 20 voxels). 
 
 
Results 
 
Behavioral Analysis. Accuracy values for the three different motivational conditions 
are shown in fig. 3.4A, and RT values in fig. 3.4B. The three values of each type of 
measure were regressed with the two models, one accounting for the valence model 
and one for the salience model. Neither of the two models significantly fitted the data 
for accuracy measures (respectively, p = 0.2053 and p = 0.3861). Also for RT measures, 
we did not find a significant fit (p = 0.6593 for regression with the valence model, and 
p = 0.6312 for the one with the salience model). When looking at accuracy results for 
target-present and target-absent results independently, we found a pattern which 
looked very similar to our first behavioral study (Chapter 1). Namely, participants were 
better in detecting the presence of a reward-associated target than the one of a loss-
associated target (0.76 vs 0.69, p = 0.008), but were no better in reporting the absence 
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of reward-associated targets with respect to absence of loss-associated ones (0.69 vs 
0.71, p = 0.312; interaction, p = 0.017). 
 
 
MVPA Analysis. We looked at how different motivational outcomes affected category 
information on one side for categories acting as targets, and for categories acting as 
distractors. While target categories were present only in half of the trials of each block, 
the remaining three distractor categories were always present in all of the scenes of 
the block. Once again, we found that representation of visual categories in OSC as 
assessed by MVPA followed a valence, and not a salience, pattern. Category 
information values for the three motivational conditions when acting as targets are 
shown in fig. 3.5A, and for categories acting as distractors in fig. 3.5B.  
These six values were regressed with three models, one accounting for task-relevance, 
one for valence and one for salience. Both the task-relevance and the valence-based 
model significantly fitted the data (respectively, p = 0.001 and p_=_0.004), while the 
salience-based one did not (p = 0.217). Also the direct comparison between the values 
coming from the two models showed a significant fit in regressing the data in favor of 
the valence model (p = 0.006). Follow-up contrasts revealed that OSC carried more 
Fig. 3.4 (A) Accuracy values for detection of categories associated with different types of 
motivational outcomes. (B) RT values for detection of categories associated with different types of 
motivational outcomes. 
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information about reward-associated targets than loss-associated targets, p < 10¯⁴, but 
less information about reward-associated distractors than loss-associated distractors, 
p = 0.031. 
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Secondly, we investigated the hypothesis that univariate activity of midbrain dopamine 
during the search task could be related to modulation of category information in OSC. 
We used an atlas to anatomically define two regions of interest (ROIs) in the midbrain: 
Substantia Nigra (SN) and Red Nucleus (RN) (fig. 3.6A). The former represented the 
dopaminergic structure involved in our hypothesis. The second one, although located 
in close proximity to SN, is not involved in dopaminergic output, so it was chosen as a 
midbrain control region. Again, we considered two different contrasts for univariate 
activity, a valence [+1 0 -1] and a salience one [+1 -2 +1]. In each ROI, this yielded a t 
value per subject per model, representing how much, in each participant, univariate 
activation of that region followed a valence or a salience pattern. Similarly, the entity 
of modulation of category information according to a valence or a salience model in 
OSC obtained in the regression analysis was represented by a specific beta coefficient 
Fig. 3.5 (A) Amount of category information for categories acting as targets. OSC carries more 
information about reward-associated categories than about loss-associated ones. (B) Amount of 
category information for categories acting as distractors. Reward-associated categories are more 
strongly suppressed than loss-associated ones. Error bars reflect within-subject standard error. 
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per subject per model. The individual beta coefficients of the two models were then 
correlated with the individual t values garnered through the corresponding contrasts. 
 
For our SN ROI, the entity of modulation of category information in OSC according to a 
valence-based model correlated significantly with the univariate activity of the ROI (r = 
0.401, p = 0.03 (one-tailed t-test), fig. 3.6B), but this was not the case for the salience-
model correlation (r = -0.050, p = 0.545). For our RN ROI, neither of the two 
correlations resulted significant (valence model: r = -0.015, p = 0.39; salience model: r 
= -0.307, p = 0.91). Finally, we verified that the values obtained in the two regions for 
the valence models (r = 0.401 for SN and r = -0.015 for Red Nucleus) were significantly 
Fig 3.6 (A) Anatomically defined ROIs representing SN and RN. (B) Correlation between univariate 
activation of SN and categorical information in OSC. 
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different. To do this, we used Steiger’s test, which is suited for correlations sharing one 
variable in common, namely modulation of category information in OSC. The two 
correlations showed a trend towards a significant difference according to Steiger’s test 
(t(20) = 1.331, p = 0.992). 
 
Thirdly, we examined the relationship between the measures of OSC information 
content and midbrain activity described above, with scores obtained through the 
BIS/BAS questionnaire, a personality test administered at the end of the experiment. 
Individual Beta coefficients derived from regression of category information in OSC 
with a valence model correlated negatively with individual BIS (r = -0.462, p = 0.03, fig. 
3.7). This score measures the individual’s response to anxiety-relevant cues. Thus, the 
general overall bias for a stronger visual representation of rewarding stimuli with 
respect to punishing ones, was less pronounced in participants who showed higher 
sensitivity to aversive stimuli. 
Searchlight Analysis. Additionally, we used a whole-brain searchlight in order to look 
for regions of the brain which retained a representation of the category of the 
attended target. In each voxel of the brain, we tested the degree to which multivoxel 
patterns in a 21-mm sphere around this voxel could discriminate the target category 
based on the category-specific patterns from the independent localizer. Three 
separate clusters came out of this analysis: two symmetrical ventral areas, and a dorsal 
one closer to the midline. The ventral clusters roughly corresponded to OSC, even 
Fig 3.7 Relationship 
between BIS values 
and valence 
coefficients for 
category 
information in OSC. 
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though in our main analysis this region was evaluated on an individual basis, while in 
this case we created a mean region across subjects (Fig. 3.8). 
 
The dorsal cluster was located in correspondence to right PPC (Fig. 3.9A). This is 
consistent with a recent study reporting the representation of abstract object identity 
in this region, as assessed by MVPA (Jeong & Xu, 2016). In order to test whether 
category information was modulated by motivational outcome also in this area, we 
performed, with the six values representing targets and distractors, a similar 
regression analysis as we did in OSC, using the task-relevance, salience and valence 
models as predictors (Fig. 3.9B). In this case we found, first of all, that coefficients for 
the valence model did not differ from zero, p = 0.496. At the same time, instead, the 
salience model was significantly represented, p = 0.002. Task-relevance fit was 
unsurprisingly positive, p < 10¯⁴. Follow-up contrasts revealed that there was a trend 
for a stronger representation of reward- than for neutral targets, p = 0.116, and a 
similar trend for a stronger representation of loss-associated than neutral categories, p 
= 0.123. More reliable results were present about distractor categories, such that 
Fig. 3.8 (A) OSC as 
defined in the OSC 
localizer. Voxels 
identified here were 
present in the OSC of 
16 or more of the 23 
participants of the 
study. (B) Results 
from the searchlight 
contrast for targets 
vs distractors. Voxels 
identified here 
constitute the center 
of spheres that were 
selective for targets 
at p< 0.001 with a 
cluster threshold of 
50 voxels. 
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reward-associated targets were more strongly suppressed than neutral ones, p = 
0.020, and a similar suppression with respect to the neutral category was present for 
the punishment-associated target, p = 0.003. 
 
Univariate Analysis. Finally, we also performed a whole-brain analysis which looked at 
the univariate activation for our two models, the valence and the salience one.  The 
salience contrast revealed an increase in activation in bilateral middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG), left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), right inferior parietal lobe (IPL), right anterior 
insula (AI), anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
precuneus, bilateral fusiform gyrus and cerebellum (Table I and Fig. 3.10). 
Fig. 3.9 (A) Parietal cluster identified in the searchlight analysis. The region was defined by 
contrasting information content for targets vs distractors. Centroid: +9, -73, +43, MNI space. (B) 
Representation of the different categories in the parietal cluster. This time category information for 
motivational categories was found to follow the salience, and not the valence, pattern. 
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Table I Activity clusters associated with the salience contrast 
Region  L/R k x y z T 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 693 39 32 20 7.3 
Precuneus  L/R 87 6 -64 40 7.22 
Lingual  R 87 18 -97 -8 6.94 
Fusiform Gyrus  L  33 -73 -18  
Inferior Parietal Lobe  R 402 45 -55 37 6.83 
aMCC  L/R 140 6 29 37 6.24 
Fusiform gyrus  L 86 -27 -85 -18 6.2 
Superior Parietal Lobe  L 70 -24 -70 47 5.62 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 65 -39 35 16 5.60 
Anterior Insula  R 51 36 23 -8 5.08 
Cerebellum  L/R 83 -6 -76 -25 5.02 
PCC  L/R 43 -6 -28 30 4.87 
Inferior frontal gyrus  L 45 -48 11 16 4.35 
L: left hemisphere; R: right hemisphere; k: cluster size; xyz: Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. 
Fig. 3.10 Univariate activation for the salience contrast (display cutoff p < 0.001, k > 20 voxels). 
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Table II Activity clusters associated with the valence contrast 
Region  L/R k x y z T 
Insula  L 64 -45 -4 44 5.83 
Calcarine sulcus  L/R 362 -3 -76 -8 5.32 
Cerebellum  R 40 21 -31 -25 5.19 
Cerebellum  L 271 -21 -40 -32 5.17 
Thalamus  R  15 -10 13 5.11 
Thalamus  L  -12 -10 13 5.02 
Cuneus  L 65 -21 -85 27 5.04 
Precentral gyrus  R 47 45 -10 44 4.81 
L: left hemisphere; R: right hemisphere; k: cluster size; xyz: Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. 
The increase in activation for the valence contrast showed instead a completely 
different network, encompassing thalamus, posterior caudate nucleus, cuneus, 
calcarine sulcus and cerebellum (Table II and Fig. 3.11). For both patterns, no increase 
in activation survived threshold for the negative contrasts (punishment > reward, and 
neutral > salient). 
Fig. 3.11 Univariate activation for the valence contrast (display cutoff p < 0.001, k > 20 voxels). 
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Discussion 
 
This study investigates how opposing motivational outcomes affect representation of 
real-world categories of objects in terms of category information in OSC. It extends 
previous results regarding the effects of reward in a similar task (Hickey & Peelen, 
2015), and places these findings in a broader frame. A relevant issue has been raised in 
fact with respect to studies concerning reward by Maunsell (Maunsell, 2004). He 
considered the difference between effects due to actual reward and the ones due to 
strategic and deliberate allocation of attention. We therefore dissociated these two 
variables through the contemporary use of three motivational conditions. Two of 
them, gain and loss, constituted motivationally salient targets, although in oppositely 
valenced spaces. A third one, the neutral condition, presented a negligible strategic 
relevance, and a more blunt reward value. The salience pattern could therefore 
represent either the product of a general arousal effect, or a strategic approach to the 
task, in terms of a convenient allocation of attentional resources to different stimuli. 
The valence pattern tracks instead the rewarding, incentive value of the stimuli. 
MVPA Analysis. We looked at how these different motivational conditions affected 
representation of visual objects in occipito-temporal cortex. We show that neural 
representation in OSC follows a valence, and not a salience, scheme. These results 
suggest that this portion of cortex encodes the motivational aspect of the attended 
categories not as a function of their strategic utility, but rather in terms of their 
affective valence. We also find that univariate activation of a ROI corresponding to SN, 
when analyzed through a valence contrast, predicts the change in the quality of this 
representation in occipito-temporal cortex. A similar result was obtained in another 
study considering the relationship between rewarding and neutral outcomes (Hickey & 
Peelen, 2015), but in this case also the presence of punishment is taken in 
consideration. This second set of data, therefore, on one hand gives further suggestion 
for a role played by dopamine in motivational control of visual representation, and 
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secondly it specifies that this modulation through outcome follows a valence pattern. 
An important open question regards the mechanism through which dopamine release 
would be able to modulate cortical representation in occipito-temporal cortex. This 
area lacks in fact any input from the SN/VTA complex, showing the need for an 
intermediate actor in this dynamic.  
Behavioral analysis. Behavioral results did not show any difference between 
conditions. At the same time, a more detailed analysis of these data revealed a pattern 
which looked similar to the one we found in our first behavioral study, with an increase 
in explicit accuracy for target present trials, and a lack of effect for target-absent trials 
(Chapter 2). Fewer subjects have been tested in this case, causing a decrease in the 
estimated power of this analysis from 0.999 of previous behavioral study (n = 101) to 
0.721 for this one (n = 23). Yet, the final aim of this study was to look at the neural 
effects of this manipulation, rather than at the behavioral ones. The paradigm was also 
optimized accordingly. 
Searchlight Analysis. Thirdly, we find another area, beyond occipito-temporal cortex, 
which discriminates the category of object that the subject is attending to, located in 
right PPC. This region has recently been found in another study to retain a 
representation of shape and object identity (Jeong & Xu, 2016). Moreover, 
motivational outcomes also in this case affect category representation, but, crucially, 
according to the latter of our a priori expectations, namely the salience pattern. 
This study further corroborates, and may help explaining, the findings of a previous 
behavioral study, which considered how reward and punishment affected visual search 
on a behavioral level. We found that these two outcomes impacted accuracy measures 
according to a valence and not to a salience pattern, following an apparently 
paradoxical scheme. In this study, using an almost identical paradigm, we found that 
this is paralleled by an analogous pattern of representation of visual information in 
OSC as assessed by MVPA. At the same time, we also find an area of the brain which 
represents stimuli according to the second of our expectation, the salience pattern, 
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suggesting a possible site for the alternative, rational approach to the motivational 
feedback. These complementary ways of processing payoffs may subsequently get 
integrated in order to provide a net, comprehensive account, and therefore yield a 
more sophisticated and articulate influence of motivation on perception.  
Univariate Analysis. The whole-brain univariate analysis supports these 
considerations. Two distinct network of areas came out from this analysis, suggesting 
that the brain does actually approach different motivational outcomes according to 
these two alternative and opposing schemes.  
The salience contrast, which subtended a strategic evaluation of the task, revealed the 
activation of fronto-parietal regions classically involved in the establishment of top-
down attentional control (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). This suggests that participants 
did not get a degraded visual representation of punished stimuli because they retained 
them as less important. The case was actually the opposite, as of what can be inferred 
through the analysis of the activation of these areas. Strategic top-down control was in 
fact actively deployed in the direction of giving higher priority to salient (both 
rewarding and punishing) stimuli with respect to neutral ones.  
Another set of areas, encompassing primary visual cortex, posterior caudate nucleus 
and thalamus, followed instead the valence pattern, the scheme which we have also 
found to characterize behavioral measures and the amount of information in the 
occipito-temporal region. Importantly, all these areas constitute central components 
of the network of automatic visual attention (Kim & Hikosaka, 2015). Caudate tail (CDt) 
in particular has been demonstrated to present direct connections with the temporal 
lobe, and to be involved in visual implicit memory, such as for example category 
learning (Yamamoto et al., 2012; Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, & 
Anderson, 2010). At the same time, this region has also been shown to be modulated 
by reward during tasks of visual attention (Yamamoto et al., 2013; Anderson et al., 
2014; Anderson, 2016). Basal ganglia in general have been posited as an ideal neural 
substrate for reinforcement learning (Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996). Therefore 
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CDt, which represents the component of striatum specifically involved in visual 
learning, could embody the structure encoding the implicit motivational value of visual 
stimuli. Due to its intermediate position between the SN/VTA complex and visual 
cortex, it could potentially represent the missing link in order to explain the putative 
influence of dopamine on the representation of conditioned visual stimuli. 
A new hypothetical, additional attentional bias has recently been posited in order to 
account for phenomena which are not adequately explained by the traditional top-
down/bottom-up dichotomy. Some of these apparently conflicting instances, most of 
which have been classified as examples of implicit memory, have been summarized 
and reunited under the common denominator of selection history (Awh et al., 2012). 
No structure has been suggested as a possible neural substrate for this control, but 
striatum could represent a reasonable candidate. This region is on one side centrally 
involved in the acquisition of implicit learning (Packard, Hirsh, & White, 1989; 
Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996), and on the other an important site for 
reinforcement learning. Moreover, it is the region which has been constantly found in 
studies which tried to disentangle the automatic component of reward from its 
voluntary one (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Krebs et al., 2012). An alternative source of 
endogenous control with respect to the classical fronto-parietal top-down bias would 
explain, among others, peculiar data from Rossi, where an extensive prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) lesion in macaques impeded subsequent endogenous selection only partially. 
More precisely, this deficit manifested as a function of the needed rate of task-
switching, as if this was the only component of the task where the function of PFC 
proved to be truly essential (Rossi, Bichot, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 2007). 
In this perspective, according to our data and also to a literature which reports a 
consistent association between these sets of regions and the two motivational 
schemes (Roesch and Olson, 2004; Kobayashi et al., 2006; Leathers and Olson, 2012; 
Engelmann et al., 2009; Litt et al., 2011), we also find that fronto-parietal regions 
(generally involved in the establishment of deliberate, strategic top-down selection) 
follow a salience scheme, while the activation of a series of subcortical structures, 
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which we deem responsible for automatic selection history control, is shaped by a 
valence pattern. Why? Daw and colleagues address a similar issue at the level of action 
selection and decision making (Daw et al., 2005). They consider neural and behavioral 
data which reveal a dissociation between mechanisms which regulate on one side 
simple, automatic stimulus-response contingencies, and on the other side more 
complex, model-based patterns of behavior. The former system, relying on basal 
ganglia, would be generally less accurate, while the latter one, centered on prefrontal 
cortex, would instead have to bear with the disadvantage of a longer latency. These 
two systems could sometimes work synergistically, and other times be in conflict. It 
should therefore not surprise that the more rational, utility-based salience model is 
the one elaborated by the computationally more powerful neocortical system, while 
the faster, less sophisticated subcortical controller develops instead a less strategic 
account of the different motivational conditions. In this case, the striatum-based 
controller would not be able to disentangle the negative valence of the feedback that 
subjects received even in case of correct response (although less negative than in case 
of incorrect response) from the higher absolute value that detection of a punished 
category retained. Obviously, these are only very speculative hypotheses, which try to 
put a series of experimental data into a broader frame. Further experimental data will 
potentially be able to shed more light onto these questions. 
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Chapter 4 
Neural representation of visual 
stimuli after inconsistent pairing 
with reward and punishment        
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Abstract 
 
In addition to the traditionally conceived top-down and bottom-up controls, two 
separate sources of attention have been recently postulated, one prioritizing 
rewarding, appetitive stimuli and the other one threat-associated, aversive ones. Here, 
we investigate how the representation of visual categories in occipito-temporal object-
selective cortex (OSC) as assessed by MVPA is modulated by different motivational 
outcomes (reward, loss and neutral outcome) during an inconsistent schedule of 
reinforcement. We find that two variables independently predicted the way in which 
positively and negatively valenced stimuli were prioritized with respect to each other 
across participants. On one side, the degree of responsivity to positive stimuli of 
Substantia Nigra, which has already been associated with the abovementioned reward-
driven bias, predicted the quality of the neural representation according to a positively 
valenced scheme. On the other, an index of the individual sensitivity to punishment, 
BIS, was directly correlated with the prioritization of negatively valenced stimuli with 
respect to positive ones. These results support claims for the existence of these two 
new additional attentional controls, and also for their independent contributions to the 
bias of visual representation. When analyzing univariate contrasts, the salience contrast 
shows the activation of the central executive network (CEN) and of anterior insula. The 
valence contrasts shows instead the involvement of medial cortical regions and two 
areas of striatum, namely ventral striatum (VS) and putamen. When comparing data 
from this experiment and a former one where a consistent schedule of reinforcement 
was used, we find a dissociation between the subcortical networks activated in the 
valence contrast in the two conditions. While inconsistent pairing recruits ventral 
striatum and putamen, cue presentation after consistent conditioning triggers the 
differential activation of caudate tail, a region which encodes stable object values and 
is involved in the automatic control of visual selection. 
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Introduction 
 
The release of midbrain dopamine is not static, but rather changes as a function of 
learning. While initially triggered by the presentation of a rewarding stimulus, this 
discharge shifts in time when the association with a conditioned stimulus (CS) is 
established, and then becomes elicited by the CS itself (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 
1997). We have previously shown that, during a visual search task in naturalistic scenes, 
feedback modulates the neural representation of visual categories of objects, in terms 
of the amount of information as assessed by MVPA (Chapter 3). In this paradigm, each 
category of stimuli, irrespectively of correctness of response, cued a specific 
motivational outcome: a gain, a loss, or a neutral outcome. At the same time, correct 
response still garnered the optimal payoff for each category type, pushing therefore 
participants to be accurate in all conditions. Moreover, in terms of absolute value of 
the correct response, gain and loss were the two relevant conditions, with 100 points 
each per correct detection (greater reward in the appetitive condition, and evasion of a 
greater loss in the aversive one), while the same response only garnered a negligible 
amount of 2 points in the neutral condition. We had made the two alternative 
hypotheses that the two relevant outcomes would have affected neural representation 
in an opposing or in a similar manner, following respectively valence or value. In the 
former case this modulation would have been more closely linked to the positive, 
rewarding quality of the feedback. In the latter case, the increase in representation 
could have had two possible origins. On one side, it could have been the product of a 
non-specific, automatic arousal effect present for both relevant stimuli. Alternatively, it 
could have resulted from the strategic, rational evaluation of the utility of the various 
outcomes, leading to a foreseeable increase in attention and explicit motivation 
devoted to the two relevant categories. 
Neural representation of the four visual categories was found to follow a valence 
pattern in the occipito-temporal object-selective cortex (OSC) of participants. Across 
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subjects, the extent to which this representation was modulated according to a valence 
scheme was predicted by the degree to which univariate activation of a ROI 
corresponding to Substantia Nigra (SN) followed the same pattern, suggesting a role for 
dopaminergic structures in the establishment of this bias. In a second experiment, the 
paradigm was adapted in order to investigate this dynamic on a behavioral level, and a 
similar valence pattern was found to characterize target selection and the way in which 
different motivational categories captured attention when presented as irrelevant 
distractors. These results conflict with a rational utility model, according to which 
higher attentional deployment should be devoted to the two valuable conditions, gain 
and loss, with respect to the less relevant neutral one. Thence, these data in the first 
place give further support for the presence of an automatic, irrational bias toward 
rewarding stimuli, which has been by now well reported in the literature in a series of 
contexts (Anderson et al., 2011; Awh et al., 2012; Hickey & Peelen, 2015), and which is 
found to affect representation of these stimuli on a neural level as well. In the second 
place, they suggest that this irrational, reward-associated control is mainly driven by 
the overall positive valence of the stimuli, regardless of the absolute value of the 
outcome, underscoring once again its non-strategic nature.  
Moreover, in spite of a vast literature reporting an attentional bias towards negative 
stimuli, we could not find evidence for such an effect. In this case we are not 
considering the loss condition as salient under a utilitarian point of view, because of its 
high absolute value in light of a rational evaluation. Instead, we behold it in terms of its 
threat-predictive characteristics, i.e. of its highly arousing nature and at the same time 
negative valence. Just specularly to the reward-associated control, a similarly irrational, 
task-unrelated gain in representation has been observed on a neural level for threat-
associated stimuli, as for example in the case of emotional faces (Vuilleumier, 2001) 
and other types of fear-relevant stimuli (Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 
2005). A parallel bias has been highlighted also on a behavioral level, in terms of a 
tendency to prioritize task-irrelevant, negative stimuli with respect to neutral (Mogg 
and Bradley, 1998) or also to rewarding ones (Pratto & John, 1991; Baumeister et al., 
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2001). Importantly, though, this literature often reports a role played by personality 
traits in determining the extent of this bias, such that highly anxious individuals are the 
ones exhibiting a greater effect along this line, or in some cases the only ones showing 
it (Mac Leod et al., 1986). Intriguingly, we did find an inverse correlation between trait 
anxiety levels on a personality index score and the degree to which category 
information in OSC followed the inverse valence model. In other words, in spite of a 
general tendency toward a positive valence pattern, highly anxious individual did 
display a stronger representation of stimuli paired with loss with respect to the ones 
paired with reward. 
In this study, we investigated whether the impact of feedback on stimulus 
representation could be appreciated also on a trial-by-trial basis, and moreover in the 
absence of any schedule consistency. Participants performed a similar detection task in 
naturalistic scenes, but in this case each trial could randomly present a rewarding, a 
punishing or a neutral outcome, and subject discovered the trial type only at the 
moment of feedback. The absence of a consistent schedule ruled out the possibility of 
any kind of associative learning across the different categories, and was meant to 
exclude the effects of specific outcomes’ expectation on the neural representation of 
visual categories. Moreover, in this paradigm we introduced a completely task-
irrelevant category, which could serve as a control for our analysis. This allowed us to 
rule out whether any of these correlations could be driven by an unspecific change in 
representation of all visual information depending on our variables of interest (SN 
activation and BIS score). 
 
Materials and methods 
 
Participants. Twenty-eight participants (12 female, mean age 23 ± 3 SD) took part in 
the experiment. All procedures were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of 
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Helsinki and were approved by the ethical committee of the University of Trento. Two 
participants were excluded from the analyses, as the OSC localizer did not yield any 
OSC region.  
General structure of the experiment. The experiment consisted of three parts, in this 
order: 1) the visual search task, 2) the OSC localizer, 3) the category pattern localizer. 
Stimuli were presented using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) and projected on a 
translucent screen at the end of the scanner bore. Participants viewed the screen 
through a mirror mounted on the head coil. At the end of the MR session, each subject 
was administered a BIS/BAS scale questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994). Participants 
were paid based on the number of points accumulated during the experiment. 
Visual search task.  
Stimuli. The stimulus set for the visual search task consisted of black and white pictures 
(27° × 38° visual angle) of natural scenes (n=480) selected from an online database 
(Russell et al., 2008). Images were organized in six groups, each containing 80 images: 
three groups contained one single category in isolation, and the other three contained 
the possible combinations of any other possible pair of categories. For each 
participant, only four out of these six groups were used, depending on the specific 
relevant categories. Natural scene photographs were followed by perceptual masks of 
equal size, generated by combining white noise at different spatial frequencies and 
superimposing naturalistic structure on the noise (Walther et al., 2009). 
Procedure. Participants performed 5 runs of 590 s duration, each containing 8 blocks of 
60 s. Each run began and ended with 15 sec fixation. Before each block started, a 
fixation cross was presented for 6 s, and then central text for 4 s, reminding response 
contingencies and indicating the score which had been obtained up to that moment. 
From a group of 3 categories (people, cars and trees), each subject was assigned, in a 
counterbalanced order, one target1 (T1) and one target2 (T2) category, while the third 
category (T3) was never mentioned to the subject. Participants had to indicate for each 
trial whether T1 or T2 was present in the scene, through right index finger and right 
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middle finger response, respectively. Each block comprised 24 trials, 12 T1-present and 
12 T2-present, in a randomized order, so that one and only one of the two targets 
were displayed in each trial. For both targets, 6 trials contained the category by itself 
(T1 and T2), and 6 trials contained it alongside with T3 (T1T3 and T2T3). The total 
amount of trials was 960 per subjects, so that each scene was shown three times. Each 
trial started with a fixation cross (833 ms) followed by the brief presentation of the 
scene (58 ms), a mask (325 ms), the reappearance of fixation (750 ms), and the 
feedback (533 ms; Fig. 4.2A). Responses given outside the 750 ms fixation interval, or 
absence of response, garnered an incorrect performance. 
 
Each block contained 8 rewarding, 8 punishing and 8 neutral trials (4 T1-present and 4 
T2-present – both targets in half of the cases by themselves and in half of the cases 
alongside with T3 - for each outcome type), according to a random schedule, so that 
participants discovered the trial type only at the moment of feedback. Correct 
response always garnered the highest possible payoff relatively to the trial type, which 
corresponded to 100 points for rewarding, 1 point for neutral, and -100 for punishing 
trials. Incorrect responses resulted instead in 0 points for rewarding and neutral trials, 
and -200 points for punishing trials (Fig. 4.1). Net value of correct response was 
therefore 100 points for rewarding and punishing trials, and 1 point for neutral trials.  
OSC localizer.  
Stimuli. The stimulus set for the OSC Localizer consisted of black and white pictures 
(27° × 38° visual angle) of 20 daily-life objects (e.g. telephone, cheese, alarm clock) and 
their scrambled version. 
Fig. 4.1 Feedback schedule during 
the search task. Each trial of the 
block was randomly assigned to one 
of the three different types of 
outcome. Participants discovered 
this assignment at the end of the 
trial, at the moment of feedback. 
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Procedure. Participants performed one OSC localizer run of 467 s duration, containing 
24 blocks of 20 trials and 5 fixation blocks. The run began and ended with 15 sec 
fixation. Before the first block of the run, a 2 s display reminded the task to the subject. 
During each 15 s block, pictures of one type only (intact or scrambled) were presented, 
while subjects monitored for image repetition, which occurred once in a block. Each 
trial started with a fixation cross (350 ms) followed by the picture of the intact or 
scrambled object (400 ms). Every fifth block was a 15 s fixation block with no stimuli. 
Category pattern localizer. 
Stimuli. The stimulus set for the category localizer consisted of four groups of stimuli, 
one for each of the categories cued in the visual search task (people, cars, houses and 
trees). Each group consisted of 40 black and white pictures (27° × 38° visual angle) of 
isolated exemplars of the same category on a white background. Pictures of people 
were headless, as faces in the search task scenes were generally too small to be 
visually solved. 
Procedure. Participants performed one category localizer run of 497 s duration, 
containing 24 blocks of 20 trials and 7 fixation blocks. The run began and ended with 
15 sec fixation. Before the first block of the run, a 2 s display reminded the task to the 
subject. During each 15 s block, pictures of different exemplars of only one of the four 
categories were presented, while subjects monitored for image repetition, which 
occurred once in a block. Each trial started with a fixation cross (350 ms) followed by 
the picture of the intact or scrambled object (400 ms). Every fifth block was a 15 s 
fixation block with no stimuli. 
fMRI Data Acquisition.  
Imaging was conducted on a Brucker BioSpin MedSpec 4T head scanner (Bruker 
BioSpin), equipped with an eight-channel head coil. T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-
planar images were collected as functional volumes for all the functional runs (EPI; 
repetition time = 2 s, echo time = 28 ms, flip angle = 73°, 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxel size, 0.99 
mm gap, 30 slices, 192 mm field of view, 64 ×  64 matrix size). A T1-weighted image 
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(MPRAGE; 1 × 1 × 1 mm voxel size; 256 slices, 224 × 176 matrix size) was obtained as a 
high-resolution anatomical reference. 
fMRI Preprocessing.  
All neuroimaging data were analyzed using MATLAB and SPM12. The volumes were 
motion corrected, slice time corrected, coregistered to the structural image and 
spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template (as 
included in SPM12). Functional volumes were then smoothed using a 6-mm full-width 
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. All analyses were performed on the smoothed data. 
fMRI Data Analysis.  
A separate general linear model was created for each of the three phases. The blood-
oxygen-level-dependent signal of each voxel in each participant was modeled using 
two regressors of interest in the OSC localizer, one for intact and one for scrambled 
objects. Three regressors of interest representing the various categories (people, cars 
and trees) were used in the category localizer. Twelve regressors of interest were used 
for the visual search task, corresponding to the 4 combinations of categories present in 
the scene (T1, T1T3, T2, T2T3), each of them in combination with the three different 
outcome types (rewarding, neutral or punishing). In all models, six additional 
regressors of no interest obtained from the realignment procedure were included to 
account for head motion. Finally, all models also presented an intrinsic temporal high-
pass filter of 1/128 HZ to correct for slow scanner drifts. 
OSC ROI definition.  
OSC was functionally defined in each participant by contrasting, within temporo-
occipital regions, responses evoked in the intact and in the scrambled condition (p < 
0.001, uncorrected; voxel extent threshold k > 20). Mean OSC size was 686 voxels ± 
682 SD. OSC was created through the MarsBar toolbox (Brett et al, 2002). 
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Fig. 4.2 (A) Trial structure. Participants reported which of the two cued categories was present in 
each scene. (B) Data Analysis. Patterns from the different trial conditions were correlated with 
category localizers’ patterns. For each scene, one task-relevant category was present, one task-
relevant category was absent, and one category unbeknownst to the participant could have been 
present or absent. (C) Correlation values were then organized according to outcome, category 
presence and task-relevance. In the example shown the participant had to look for trees and cars, 
while people was the irrelevant (and never mentioned) category. 
100 
 
MVPA.  
All pattern analyses were performed using CoSMo-MVPA (Oosterhof et al., 2016). For 
each subject, three patterns (one for each object category) were obtained from the 
category localizer, and twelve patterns (one for each trial type) from the visual search 
task. This was done by extracting t values of each voxel for each condition, only for 
voxels comprised in the ROI of each subject. Following existing work, t values were 
normalized by subtracting, for each voxel, the mean value obtained for that voxel 
across all conditions of the single task. Normalized t values of all three conditions from 
the category localizer were then correlated with all twelve conditions of the visual 
search task, across all voxels of the ROI (Fig. 4.2B). This yielded a 3 × 12 correlation 
matrix, whose values were then Fisher-transformed and organized in terms of whether 
the category was present or absent in the scene (Fig. 4.2C). Values were averaged 
across target type for task-relevant categories (T1 and T2), and across scene type for 
the task irrelevant-category (T1T3 and T2T3). This yielded a 3 (feedback type) × 2 
(present vs absent) × 2 (task-relevant vs task-irrelevant) matrix. 
Statistical Analysis.  
Differences between conditions across subjects were then tested using a three-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA (RANOVA), with task relevance (T1-T2 vs T3), category 
presence (T1 vs T2) and motivational condition (rewarding, punishing or neutral) as 
factors. Subsequently, a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with category presence 
(present vs absent) and motivational condition (rewarding, punishing or neutral) was 
performed separately on data regarding task-relevant and irrelevant categories. 
Correlation analysis.  
The three MVPA values representing the different outcome conditions (reward, 
neutral, loss) of each category type (relevant-present, relevant-absent, irrelevant-
present) were modeled according to two predictors: one accounting for a valence-
based model [+1 0 -1], and a second one accounting for a salience-based one [+1 -2 +1] 
(the values for each vector were standardized).  
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For each subject, a single t value was calculated for a valence [+1 0 -1], and another 
one for a salience [+1 -2 +1] contrast of the mean univariate activity during the visual 
search task, for a ROI corresponding to Substantia Nigra. The ROI was anatomically 
defined through WFU PickAtlas, a software which is based on the Talairach Daemon 
database (Maldjian et al., 2003).  
Individual t values of both contrasts were then correlated (Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation) with the individual beta coefficients of the multiple linear regression of 
OSC category information modulation of the corresponding model. This correlation 
was calculated for each of the three category types. A similar correlation was 
performed between participants’ BIS scores and the individual beta coefficients of the 
multiple linear regression of OSC category information. Finally, a multiple linear 
regression of individual category information values was performed using both 
measures as predictors. 
Univariate analysis. 
The regressors of the target-present trials of the three motivational categories [reward 
neutral punishment] were contrasted according to the valence [+1 0 -1] and to the 
salience [+1 -2 +1] pattern. Individual participants’ contrast images entered a second 
level t-test (threshold set at P < 0.001, cluster corrected for multiple-comparisons, 
voxel extent threshold k > 20). 
Striatum ROI analysis. 
ROIs for the three different areas of striatum coming out in the whole-brain valence 
contrast from the first (CDt) and the second (VS and Putamen) paradigm were created 
using the MarsBar toolbox (Fig. 4.9A). For each subject, T-values from all the voxels 
were averaged for each ROI, and the individual values of this 3 (regions) × 2 
(paradigms) matrix underwent a mixed two-way ANOVA. 
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Connectivity analysis. 
FC analyses were carried out using the CONN-fMRI functional connectivity toolbox v17 
(Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012). This software applies linear regression 
and band-pass filtering in order to remove unwanted motion, physiological, and other 
artifactual effects from the BOLD signal before computing connectivity measures. We 
considered three different sources of possible confounders: 1) BOLD signal from the 
white matter and CSF masks (by the use of the aCompCor strategy); 2) realignment 
parameters; and 3) the main condition effects (condition blocks convolved with hrf). As 
suggested, a frequency window of 0.01 to 0.1 Hz was used for band-pass filtering. 
Resting state FC (rsFC) was evaluated using functional scans from the first study (so 
connectivity across all scans, irrespectively of task conditions). The seed-to-voxel FC 
analysis was performed using each one of three regions from the ROI analysis (VS, 
putamen and CDt) as seeds. Seed-to-voxel FC maps were created for each participant, 
and then individual seed-to-voxel maps were entered into a second-level analysis. The 
threshold for significance was set to p < 0.05 whole brain cluster level FDR corrected 
with a cluster building threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected on voxel level. 
 
 
Results 
 
Behavioral Analysis. Mean accuracy values (and their standard deviation (SD)) were 
0.8662 (±0.08) for rewarding trials, 0.8717 (±0.07) for neutral trials, and 0.8673 (±0.06) 
for punishing trials. RT values were 588 ms (±51) for rewarding, 587 ms (±50) for 
neutral, and 589 ms (±52) for punishing trials. A one-way RANOVA showed the absence 
of any main effect of motivational condition both for accuracy (F₍2ˌ₂₅₎ = 0.621, p = 
0.541) and for RT values (F₍2ˌ₂₅₎ = 0.510, p = 0.603). 
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MVPA Analysis. The amount of information for the various categories in the scenes 
was organized as a function of task-relevance, presence and motivational condition 
(Fig. 4.3). First we performed a three-way RANOVA, which showed a main effect of 
category presence, and an interaction between task-relevance and category presence 
(category presence, F₍₁ˌ₂₅₎ = 9.831, p = 0.004, task-relevance × presence, F₍₁ˌ₂₅₎ = 4.761, 
p = 0.039). 
 
This allowed us to separate measures for task-irrelevant categories (which were never 
mentioned to participants) and task-relevant categories, and to look at the effect of 
category presence and motivational outcome for each group independently. A second 
two-way RANOVA conducted on task-relevant categories showed a main effect of 
category presence and no main effect of motivational outcome nor an interaction 
(F₍₁ˌ₂₅₎ = 12.504, p = 0.002). Another two-way RANOVA conducted instead on task-
irrelevant categories did not show any effect of category presence or motivational 
outcome (all F values < 1). This suggests that while the presence of T1 and T2 
modulated category information the presence of T3 was fundamentally negligible in 
terms of modulation of visual representation. 
Fig. 4.3 (A) Amount of category information in OSC for task-relevant categories (T1 and T2), whether 
present or absent in the scene, and also as a function of the motivational outcome received after 
response; (B) same for task-irrelevant category (T3). 
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Correlation analysis. Subsequently, we tested whether the change in the amount of 
category information across subjects could be predicted by the pattern of the 
univariate activation of SN, as it was the case for our previous study (Chapter 3). We 
calculated individual t values for the valence and for the utility contrast of the 
activation of this ROI and correlated them with the respective model coefficients from 
multivariate analysis of information in OSC. Again, we found that the t values of the 
valence contrast of univariate activation of the SN ROI predicted the change in 
category information in OSC according to the valence model (ρ = 0.399, p = 0.044; Fig. 
4.4), while the same correlation did not yield any significant result for the utility model 
(ρ = 0.097, p = 0.635). 
 
Moreover, in this paradigm we were able to test whether this correlation was specific 
to the present task-relevant category, or also extended to the modulation of the 
amount of category information for the other two categories of the study, the absent 
task-relevant one (T1 or T2), or T3 (when present). No other category beyond the task-
relevant present one showed any correlation with the activation of SN, considering 
Fig. 4.4 Correlation between univariate activation of SN according to the valence contrast and 
valence coefficients for category information in OSC. 
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both possible models (correlation of OSC information regressed through the valence 
model with SN activation was ρ = 0.216, p = 0.287 for the task-relevant absent 
category, and ρ = -0.015, p = 0.941 for T3 (present); correlation of the utility 
coefficients was ρ = -0.128, p = 0.531 for the task-relevant absent category, and ρ = -
0.105, p = 0.608 for T3 (present)). 
Then, we looked at the correlation between measures of personality as assessed 
through the BIS/BAS questionnaire and the amount of category information in OSC. 
Like in previous study, we found an inverse relationship between the BIS score of 
participants (an index of the individual response to punishment-related cues) and the 
valence coefficients from the multivariate analysis of information in OSC (ρ = -0.501, p 
= 0.009; Fig. 4.5). 
 
In order to look at the independency between these two variables and at their 
reciprocal interaction in the modulation of category information in OSC, we 
subsequently performed a multiple linear regression of the individual values of this 
measure, using the participants’ BIS scores and valence contrasts of SN activation as 
Fig. 4.5 Correlation between BIS score of participants and valence coefficients for category 
information in OSC. 
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predictors. Both coefficient regressors showed to significantly predict category 
information (SN activation: t = 2.695; p = 0.013; BIS: t = -3.690; p = 0.001). Adjusted R-
squared showed an increase when using both predictors together (R2adj = 0.416), with 
respect to regressions which only used one of them (SN: R2adj = 0.110; BIS: R2adj = 
0.264). 
For illustration purposes, we show the amount of conditional category information, 
after dividing the general population in four subgroups, obtained performing a median 
split within both abovementioned variables (Fig. 4.6). The impact of motivational 
outcomes on category information was clearly detectable in the two groups which 
presented the effects going in the same directionality for both variables (e.g. High 
BIS/Low SN activation, and Low BIS/High SN activation). These two groups showed a 
significant difference between the rewarded and the punished category (High BIS/Low 
SN activation: t = -4.538; p = 0.006; Low BIS/High SN activation: t = 2.785; p = 0.039), 
obviously in opposite directions. 
Univariate Analysis. Analysis of univariate activation revealed two separate networks 
representing salience and valence, as in our previous study (Chapter 3). The salience 
contrast showed bilateral activation of anterior insula (AI), inferior occipital gyrus 
(IOG), and a right-lateralized fronto-parietal network (Fig. 4.7 and table I). The valence 
contrast showed instead an increase in activation in bilateral VS, in a big cluster 
spanning throughout the whole medial cortical surface, encompassing calcarine cortex, 
precuneus, orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (omPFC), anterior (ACC) and posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), and finally right putamen, right middle frontal and precentral 
gyrus (Fig. 4.8 and table II). Thus, just like in previous study, motivational modulation 
of striatal regions, which we have hypothesized to subtend selection history control 
(Chapter 3), was found to follow a valence scheme, stressing the strongly automatic 
and potentially irrational nature of this bias. At the same time, different areas of 
striatum showed increased activation in the two studies, i.e. caudate tail (CDt) in the 
former and VS and putamen in the latter. The different striatal region receive input 
from different parts of the cortex, and take part into partially independent 
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corticostriatal loops: the motivational (which depends on VS), the executive (caudate 
head), the motor (putamen) and the visual loop (caudate body and CDt) (Seger, 2008).  
While the first loop has shown to display mainly feedback-related activity, the motor 
and the visual loop are thought to represent learning-related regions, which store 
specific motor response-outcome (motor loop) and stimulus-outcome (visual loop) 
associations. Consequently, we performed a ROI analysis on these regions, which 
confirmed their alternative preferential recruitment, depending on whether a 
consistent or inconsistent schedule or reinforcement was applied to visual stimuli. 
 
Fig. 4.6 Category information results for the four groups coming out of the median splits within both 
variables of interest. On the horizontal dimension, we see the effects of increasing values of BIS 
scores, and on the vertical dimension the effects of increasing valence coefficients for activation of 
SN. 
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Table I Activity clusters associated with the salience contrast 
Region L/R k x y z T 
Salient>Neutral       
Inferior Occipital Gyrus L 34 -21 -94 -10 6.83 
Anterior Insula R 125 33 17 -10 6.69 
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 249 42 20 46 6.25 
Inferior Parietal Lobe R 188 48 -52 54 6.01 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus R 58 27 -94 -6 5.72 
Anterior Insula L 31 -30 20 -6 4.80 
Neutral > salient (not shown)       
Postcentral Gyrus R 186 66 -13 18 6.06 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus L 91 -45 -73 -2 5.35 
Cuneus R 50 15 -85 18 5.21 
L: left hemisphere; R: right hemisphere; k: cluster size; xyz: Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Univariate activation for the salience contrast (display cutoff p < 0.001, k > 20 voxels). 
109 
 
 
Table II Activity clusters associated with the valence contrast 
Region  L/R k x y z T 
Reward>Punishment        
Precuneus  L/R 2800 3 -43 50 8.06 
Middle frontal gyrus  R 68 27 35 50 6.05 
Precentral gyrus  R 50 39 -13 54 5.74 
Ventral striatum  R 73 15 11 2 5.20 
Superior frontal gyrus  L 78 -24 29 46 4.72 
Putamen  R 43 33 -4 2 4.64 
Ventral striatum  L 50 -9 -14 -2 4.29 
Punishment > Reward        
None        
L: left hemisphere; R: right hemisphere; k: cluster size; xyz: Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. 
ROI Analysis. In order to evaluate more accurately the function of striatum in the two 
different paradigms, we performed, for both conditions, a ROI analysis on the three 
regions which showed differential activation in the valence contrast of the two studies 
Fig. 4.8 Univariate activation for the valence contrast (display cutoff p < 0.001, k > 20 voxels). 
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(CDt in the former and VS and right putamen in the latter) (Fig. 4.9A). Results are 
shown in Fig. 4.9B for data from current study and in Fig. 4.10C for data from previous 
experiment. A mixed two-way ANOVA showed an interaction between striatum region 
and paradigm (F = 7.661, p < 10⁻⁴). 
 
Functional Connectivity Analysis. We had a particular concern in ascertaining our CDt 
identification, given the small dimensions of this area and its relatively recent 
investigation in fMRI studies, which renders hard to define its localization in a rigorous 
way. To this aim, we evaluated resting state functional connectivity (FC) of the three 
striatum regions used in the ROI analysis, and checked whether they showed the 
expected patterns of connectivity. We used functional data from the first paradigm as 
Fig 4.9 (A) ROIs representing VS, right putamen and CDt. (B) Univariate activation for the three ROIs 
in the paradigm following inconsistent motivational schedule. (C) Univariate activation for the three 
ROIs in the paradigm following consistent motivational schedule. 
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our main interest lay on confirmation of the identification of the ROI which showed its 
activation in that study. All three ROIs showed the expected patterns of FC. 
VS was preferentially connected to brainstem, bilateral frontal orbital cortex, 
thalamus, insular cortex (IC) and inferior frontal gyrus (Fig. 4.10 and Table III for a full 
list). 
 
The right Putamen ROI displayed a preferential connectivity with brainstem, bilateral 
IC, central opercular cortex, Pre- and Postcentral gyrus, thalamus, supramarginal gyrus, 
planum temporale, parietal operculum, planum polare, Heschl’s gyrus and 
supplementary motor cortex (Fig 4.11 and table IV for a full list). Interestingly, this 
unilateral seed showed a perfectly bilateral connectivity. Finally, and crucially, the CDt 
Fig. 4.10 Regions showing increased connectivity with the Ventral Striatum ROI (display cutoff p < 
0.001, k > 50 voxels). 
112 
 
ROI showed a preferential connectivity with cuneus, precuneus, PCC, brainstem, and 
with bilateral LOC, lingual gyrus, fusiform gyrus, calcarine cortex, occipital pole, 
thalamus, IC, and left inferior temporal gyrus (Fig. 4.12 and Table V for a full list). 
 
Fig. 4.11 Regions showing increased connectivity with the right Putamen ROI (display cutoff p < 
0.001, k > 50 voxels). 
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Discussion 
 
In this study we investigated whether unexpected and inconsistent motivational 
feedback is able to affect the trial-by-trial representation of visual stimuli, when 
assessed through MVPA. Such a modulation would shed light onto the mechanisms 
through which perceptual conditioning of stimuli is instantiated. Nevertheless, when all 
Fig. 4.12 Regions showing increased connectivity with the Caudate Tail ROI (display cutoff p < 0.001, 
k > 50 voxels). 
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subjects were pooled together, we could not observe a differential effect of feedback 
on the amount of category information for the different motivational categories. At the 
same time, we did find once again that, across subjects, the modulation exerted by 
outcome on this visual representation was strongly influenced on one side by 
univariate activation of Substantia Nigra (SN), and on the other side by trait anxiety 
levels of participants.  
On one hand, subjects whose SN followed a valence pattern more strongly, also 
showed a stronger representation of stimuli according to a positive valence scheme. 
This strengthens the idea that activation of dopaminergic areas is in some way related 
to the change in representation of visual information. In a previous study we 
formulated a hypothesis about how this could be implemented, in spite of the absence 
of any direct connection between visual cortex and SN (Chapter 3). Moreover, in this 
study we were also able to test the specificity of this correlation with respect to various 
stimuli present (or not) in the scene. The correlation of the activation of SN with the 
amount of category information was found to be restricted to the present task-relevant 
category. This is important when considering models of reinforcement learning which 
address how reward (and in this case also punishment) is able to distinctly modulate 
representation of stimuli which play different roles in the same perceptual context 
(Roelfsema, van Ooyen, & Watanabe, 2010). 
On the other hand, the higher the BIS scores (an index of the individual response to 
punishment-related cues) of participants, the more they represented categories 
according to an inverse valence pattern, with an increase in representation for stimuli 
paired with loss and a decrease in representation for stimuli paired with reward. These 
two opposite influences cancelled out each other reciprocally across the population as 
a whole, but were clearly detectable when considering median splits of participants 
across these two dimensions. These two independent correlations replicated the ones 
we found in a previous study, where a consistent schedule of reinforcement was 
applied. At the same time, in the previous experiment only the gain-associated increase 
in representation resulted in perceptual conditioning, causing an overall positively 
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valenced bias, while a similar type of conditioning did not occur for the loss-associated 
stimuli. Which could be the reason for this difference? 
As briefly mentioned before, a consistent literature has grown over time with respect 
to an additional source of attention, the “emotional bias” (Vuilleumier, 2005; Pourtois, 
Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013). These studies have shown a prioritization of task-
irrelevent threat-predictive stimuli with respect to task-irrelevant neutral ones, both on 
a behavioral and on a neural level (Vuilleumier, 2001; Brosch et al., 2011). At the same 
time, a clear influence of stimulus type and personality trait has emerged with respect 
to the extent of this bias across subjects. During a dot-probe task, task-irrelevant 
threat-related words were found to be able to capture attention, but only in clinically 
anxious participants. On the other hand, control subjects tended to shift attention 
away from the same type of stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg et al., 1995) 
Consistent results were also found in studies performed in non-clinical populations, 
but looking at differences in trait anxiety (Vandenhout et al., 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 
1999). In order to account for this discrepancy, Mogg and Bradley (1998) developed 
the cognitive-motivational model. This theory posits that the relationship between the 
subjective threat value and attentional bias is not linear. For low values of threat, the 
individual will tend to ignore the stimulus; for high values of threat, selective attention 
will start to enhance it. Differences among individuals would therefore lie in the 
threshold at which selective attention will shift from suppression to prioritization. This 
also means that the effect of fearful and angry faces on attention may be due not 
simply to their aversive valence, but also to their stronger salience. As a consequence 
of this, the value of the stimulus will trespass the threshold which causes a shift from 
avoidance to capture within a bigger sector of the population under study (for an 
effect of different types of negative emotional expressions, see Ohman (2001) ). 
In view of these considerations, the lack of prioritization observed for aversive stimuli 
in our first MR study (chapter 3) could be due to the low level of arousal for visual 
stimuli which underwent conditioning with monetary rewards and punishments. With 
respect to this paradigm, an interpretation of the lack of a general effect for the various 
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motivational conditions, could be then instead, that stimuli paired with loss presented 
in this case a higher level of arousal. The stronger effect of the aversive bias contrasted 
the opposite gain given by the positive bias on the reward vs punishment contrast, and 
the two controls cancelled each other out reciprocally across the whole population. In 
this case, which could be the reason for a diversity between the level of arousal of 
aversive stimuli from very similar paradigms (chapter 3 and 4), which only differ in 
terms of the consistency of the type of reinforcement? A possible explanation could lie 
in the arousing properties of unexpected events. Mogg and Bradley (1998) state the 
following about BIS: 
A primary function of the BIS is to compare actual with expected stimuli. The BIS 
operates in two modes. If actual stimuli are compatible with expected stimuli, it 
remains in `checking' mode, and control over behaviour remains with other 
brain systems, such as those involved in pursuing ongoing goals. However, if the 
actual and expected stimuli are discordant, or if the predicted stimuli are 
aversive, then the BIS takes direct control over behaviour, adopting a `control' 
model. (p.7).  
This suggests that stimuli with a similar motivational value could trigger a state of 
higher arousal when unexpected. Another possible explanation is that, while effects 
from both forms of motivational controls are present at the level of the single trial, only 
the positive valence bias would trigger a long-lasting conditioning of the visual stimulus 
bound to the corresponding outcome. This is in contrast with the idea of aversive 
conditioning, according to which stimuli paired with punishment elicit a specific type of 
associative learning, but again it could be the case that only stimuli exceeding a certain 
threshold would undergo a similar form of plasticity. Additional studies will help 
answering these questions. 
Results from univariate analysis in the first place replicate findings from previous 
studies which address the representation of valence and salience in the brain. Both 
electrophysiological studies in animals (Roesch & Olson, 2004; Kobayashi et al., 2006; 
Leathers & Olson, 2012) and imaging studies in humans (Engelmann et al., 2009; Litt et 
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al., 2011) have highlighted a salience network in dlPFC, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), 
insula and dACC, and a valence one in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), VS, rACC and PCC. 
This is confirmed in a meta-analysis by Bartra, which takes in consideration 206 
published fMRI studies investigating neural correlates of subjective value (Bartra et al., 
2013). We performed an equivalent analysis in our previous study, where a similar 
dissociation was found (Chapter 3). Even there, fronto-parietal regions (bilateral MFG 
and right IPL) showed a selective involvement in the salience contrast, while a series of 
subcortical and medial cortical regions were activated in the valence one. At the same 
time, when considering regions of striatum activated in the valence contrast, CDt was 
preferentially involved in the former experiment, and VS (and putamen) in the latter 
one. 
There is an extremely long track record with regard to the connection between reward 
and VS, the region of striatum which is mostly linked with the hedonic aspect of 
reward, the liking (Berridge, 2007; Miller et al., 2014). With respect to the roles of 
different regions of the striatum, models of instrumental conditioning posit for VS the 
role of the “critic”, which learns to predict future reward, and for the dorsal striatum 
the role of the “actor”, which stores information about learnt stimulus-response 
associations (O’Doherty, Dayan, Schultz, Deichmann, Friston, & Dolan, 2004). 
Accordingly, VS has been found to track prediction error, and dorsal striatum to encode 
reward prediction (Seger et al., 2010). Other studies found feedback-related activity 
centered on VS and head of the caudate, and learning-related activity in the putamen 
and the body and tail of the caudate (Seger, 2008). All of these studies highlight a 
ventromedial-dorsolateral gradient which transforms reward-related information into 
specific stimulus-outcome associations. A similar hierarchy of information flow has 
been hypothesized by Haber and colleagues, who found that also at the cellular level 
the relationship among the different striatal regions via the midbrain dopamine cells is 
organized according to “an ascending spiral” (Haber et al., 2000).  
This gradient has been mostly studied at the level of instrumental responses, but 
analogous models exist with respect to sensory stimuli. A “visual loop”, which connects 
118 
 
temporal regions with CDt, guides visual object identification, assisting visual cortex in 
selection of appropriate visual representations (Seger et al., 2010). Moreover, 
representation of visual stimuli in this area has been shown to be modulated by reward 
(Yamamoto et al., 2013; Anderson et al., 2016), constituting a potential neural 
substrate for instances of the reward-associated attentional bias observed in human 
studies (DellaLibera and Chelazzi, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011). A direct comparison 
between the roles of the two opposite poles of caudate nucleus in processing 
conditioned visual stimuli has been pursued on an electrophysiological level: Kim and 
Hikosaka found that the head and the tail of the caudate encode flexible and stable 
values of visual objects, respectively (Kim & Hikosaka, 2013). The comparison between 
the results of our two fMRI studies represents a coherent correlate of this dynamic for 
human imaging. At the same time, while in the study by Kim and Hikosaka flexible 
stimuli retained the same value across the whole block and changed it only across 
blocks, in our second paradigm no consistent mapping at all was present between 
visual stimuli and outcome, even within the block. The two situations are thus similar, 
but not totally analogous. If visual stimuli retained the same value across blocks also in 
our case, following this line of reasoning, we could have expected increased activation 
in the caudate head, instead that at the level of VS. Increased activation at the level of 
VS then most probably reflects pure processing of the feedback, which in this case 
cannot be attributed to any specific visual category though. 
In sum, according to this account, before a consistent association between a visual 
stimulus and a motivational value is established, trial-to-trial outcomes are tracked only 
at the level of VS. When a consistent pairing between stimulus and outcome is present, 
conditioning takes place, and stimulus-reward associations start to be encoded more 
dorsally and posteriorly. If this association is temporary and supported by working 
memory, it is encoded at the level of the head of the caudate (Seger, 2008; Kim and 
Hikosaka, 2013). When the association is prolonged in time, it starts to be represented 
at the level of CDt (Seger et al., 2010). Interestingly, this spatial shift in the locus of 
striatal activation could also possibly underpin the temporal shift of activation which 
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we appreciate at the level of midbrain dopamine release, once a cue-outcome 
association is established (Schultz et al., 1997). In fact, the main input to midbrain 
dopamine cells is constituted by afferents from the basal ganglia. The differential 
recruitment that we observe would therefore underlie the process through which a 
previously neutral element (CS-) acquires predictive value and starts to cue the 
subsequent receipt of a specific outcome (CS+). 
One important specificity of our studies concerns the relationship between opposite 
motivational outcomes. In this respect, we find that it is the valence representation of 
visual stimuli, not the salience one, which is progressively processed according to this 
implicit flow of information. A common thread in the way in which this implicit 
perceptual bias has been found to affect selection is constituted by its involuntary and 
anti-strategic nature, which could be explained by a model-free, simple controller, 
which cannot exploit the higher computational efficiency of neocortex. It should be 
pointed out that valence implies a model-free controller, but the opposite is not true: a 
model-free controller could potentially follow a salience-based pattern, as long as the 
punishment outcome starts to prioritize selection. This is indeed the case in many 
instances, and our model does not exclude such a situation. 
Finally, another point could be made with respect to the relationship of our two 
models with awareness. We have hypothesized the salience network to represent 
deliberate, volitional top-down control and the valence one to embody the automatic 
and unconscious selection history bias. One obvious feature of volitional control 
consists in its link with awareness, and it could be interesting to notice that the areas 
which differentially activate for the model-based, rational scheme of behavior 
encompass the regions which have been more strictly connected to consciousness, 
namely parietal and prefrontal cortex (Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002). Intriguingly, this 
correspondence extends to visual regions: in both paradigms, we find that primary 
visual regions follow the valence pattern, while bilateral fusiform gyrus exhibits a 
salience mode of activation. This reflects the subdivision that we also find for visual 
areas in terms of their contribution to conscious experience. On one side, activity in V1 
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has been shown to be largely independent from, and scarcely contributing to, 
conscious perception (He, Cavanagh, & Intriligator, 1996). On the other, activity in 
ventral visual cortex correlates instead rather well with conscious visual experience, 
and seems to be a necessary, even if not sufficient, component for awareness (Hirsch, 
DeLaPaz, Relkin, Victor, Kim, Li, Borden, Rubin, & Shapley, 1995). As mentioned before, 
the additional contribution of fronto-parietal regions constitutes an essential factor to 
this process, as can be seen in the case of neglect, where the sensory stimulation leads 
to activation of association visual areas but fails to reach consciousness (Driver & 
Mattingley, 1998). 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and general discussion 
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Reward is an important tool to investigate the relationship between top-down control 
and bottom-up salience in visual attention. In fact, limits of this theoretical account 
have been highlighted for a series of phenomena, like priming of pop-out or value-
driven attentional capture, where visual selection could not be explained either by 
current task goals nor by physical salience of the stimulus. An additional source of 
attentional control has accordingly been posited, characterized on one hand by its 
endogenous nature, but on the other also by its automaticity. This represents an 
important caveat which aims at differentiating effects of reward due to increase of 
attention and motivation from effects due to the appetitive nature of its positive 
valence. In this framework, we thought that the investigation of the joined effects of 
reward and punishment on visual selection could have shed more light onto the issue. 
These two outcomes are in fact characterized by similar motivational salience with 
respect to a neutral stimulus (they both signal events with strong behavioral 
relevance) but at the same time by opposite valence. The mutual relationship 
between the impact of these two outcomes on visual attention was therefore 
expected to follow either of these two main patterns, or a combination of them. To 
this aim, we employed a well-developed paradigm which investigates visual search for 
object categories in naturalistic scenes. 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, we investigated this dynamic on a behavioral level, by 
looking at how different types of feedback modulated visual selection and attentional 
capture. Subjects had to look for instances of high-level categories of objects (people, 
cars, trees and houses) in briefly presented pictures of real-world scenes. These 
categories were imbued with different monetary payoffs: gain, loss or neutral outcome. 
Participants were informed at the beginning of each block about the target category, 
and about the type of feedback they would have received in case of correct 
performance. On one side, for each outcome type, target presence was always paired 
with the same directionality in outcome regardless of response (they always gained 
points with a reward category, always lost points with a punishing one, and gained a 
negligible amount of points with neutral categories). On the other, correct detection of 
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the target was always the response leading to the best possible payoff. Correct 
detection of rewarding and punishing categories was more valuable (100 points) than 
detection of neutral ones (2 points), and the first two were equally valuable between 
each other, representing the motivationally salient targets. We found that performance 
was not biased in favor of the two salient categories, as could have been expected if 
participants showed a strategic approach to the monetary feedback, or were equally 
aroused by the two relevant outcomes. Instead, both measures were found to follow a 
valence scheme, such that categories associated with loss showed a lower level of 
accuracy with respect to the ones associated with gain, and correspondingly drew less 
attention when acting as task-irrelevant distractors. 
In chapter 3, we used a very similar paradigm in an MR context, in order to see how 
category information about these stimuli as assessed by MVPA in occipito-temporal 
object-selective visual cortex (OSC) varied as a function of the same motivational 
outcomes. Again, participants had to detect the presence of real-world categories in 
natural scenes, with target type changing from block to block. Each category was tied 
to a specific rewarding, punishing or neutral payoff, so that subjects knew in advance 
the payoff they would have received in case of correct (and incorrect) performance. 
The amount of information in the scene was evaluated for each category both when it 
acted as the target and when it acted as a distractor, and as a function of motivational 
outcome. Consistently with previous literature within the field, information about the 
various categories was enhanced when they were acting as targets and suppressed 
when they were acting as distractors, irrespectively of motivational conditions. 
Moreover, we found that the representation of the various categories in OSC followed 
a valence-like pattern, with the punished category showing the lowest amount of 
increase in representation when acting as a target, and the least amount of 
suppression when acting as a distractor. Importantly, the degree to which this 
representation was following a valence pattern was found to correlate, across 
participants, with the degree to which univariate activation of dopaminergic midbrain 
regions was following a similarly valence-shaped pattern. Finally, we also found 
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evidence for a representation of visual categories in posterior parietal cortex, which, 
strikingly, followed in this case the latter of our expectations, namely the salience 
pattern. 
 
Don't think of a white bear 
In Chapter 1, I have reviewed a series of studies which found that visual attention can 
be affected by opposing motivational outcomes sometimes according to a valence, 
and sometimes according to a salience pattern. I will now try to answer a question left 
unsolved from that chapter: what causes the former or the latter pattern to shape the 
deployment of attention? In order to answer this question, I will first try to better 
delineate the nature of the reward-associated attentional bias, and then to assess 
how punishment affects it. 
A growing body of evidence has accumulated over time suggesting that the traditional 
dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up bias does not provide a complete 
account of attentional control. One example is provided by a series of studies by 
Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994, 2000), where they found that repetition of a salient 
feature of the target causes inter-trial priming in spite of task contingencies and goals. 
This phenomenon has been named priming of pop-out (PoP). Other instances are 
represented by the reward-associated phenomena that we have considered 
throughout this thesis. Awh and colleagues (2012) claim these and other examples to 
be the expression of an alternative type of control, reuniting all of these cases under a 
common framework. This additional bias, differently from exogenous control, 
depends on what has been learned about the prior trials and does not rely solely on 
the current form of the stimulus. As a consequence, some if its instances have been 
classified as top-down or endogenous (Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003). On the 
other hand, this additional bias does not necessarily represent the task-relevant set, 
and can easily lead to misallocation of attention, suggesting its automatic and non-
strategic nature. The possibility of a dissociation between endogenous and voluntary 
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control was brought to attention long ago by means of a consideration by Dostoevskij, 
who noticed how hard it could result to deliberately stop thinking about a white bear, 
after having been told to do so. This idea led to studies about thought suppression 
and to the so-called white bear problem (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). 
Awh and colleagues posit this third source of attention to be more generally based on 
selection history, with reward history being a specific instance of this more general 
category. 
What are the neural structures which subtend this alternative endogenous control?  
DlPFC and IPS have been highlighted as the brain regions giving rise to the classically 
conceived, strategic top-down bias (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Interestingly, in a 
study where the behavior of highly trained animals had already been shaped by a 
history of rewarding feedback, it was found that PFC lesion affected subsequent 
endogenous selection proportionally to the rate of task-switching (Rossi et al, 2007). 
While the impairment was small when the target feature remained relatively fixed 
over trials, it increased dramatically when this had to be rapidly switched across trials. 
This suggests the involvement of other structures in mediating attentional bias caused 
by selection history, which could explain the spared performance in the more 
constant condition. Throughout this review, we have found striatum to be 
systematically involved in the occurrence of reward-associated attentional bias 
(Pessiglione et al., 2007; Krebs et al, 2012; Anderson et al., 2014). Although the 
precise functions of this structure have not yet been completely elucidated, many 
hypotheses exist in this regard. Redgrave proposes that basal ganglia work as a central 
selector among diverse cortical and subcortical circuits which cannot all be expressed 
in parallel (Redgrave, Gurney, & Reynolds, 2008). Moreover, striatum also represents a 
core region for reinforcement learning (Montague et al., 1996). One seminal theory 
asserts that dopaminergic input to this area provides a reward prediction error signal 
which allows selection (Schultz, 2000). Redgrave's theory focuses on motor selection, 
but at the same time we know that different parts of striatum deal with different 
cortical regions and functions. Correspondingly, Seger proposes for CDt, the portion of 
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the caudate connected to temporal lobe, a role in visual selection (Seger et al, 2013). 
We have already considered a couple of electrophysiological studies regarding the 
involvement of this subregion in the deployment of visual attention (Yamamoto et al., 
2012; Yamamoto et al., 2013), and other examples exist in imaging studies on humans 
(Seger et al, 2010). 
The potential role of basal ganglia in giving rise to the selection history bias should 
not surprise, as this structure also enables implicit learning (Packard et al, 1989; 
Knowlton et al, 1996). This is a similarly automatic process, which forges simple 
stimulus-response associations following the delivery of some sort of feedback used 
as a teaching signal. Moreover, PoP itself has been explained as a form of short-term 
implicit memory (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; 2000). Reward-associated object- and 
feature-priming, value-driven attentional capture, subliminal activation of 
motivational drive, reward-driven interference in conflict-based tasks: all these 
phenomena would then represent the product of reward on implicit visual memory, in 
the form of an involuntary deployment of attention caused by a similarly automatic, 
and generally unconscious, reward expectation. Reward-associated object- and 
feature-priming would constitute a form of short-term implicit visual memory akin to 
PoP, but triggered by the delivery of reward. This would follow both consistent 
(Kristjansson et al., 2010) and inconsistent schedules (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; 
Hickey et al., 2010a), but with different fates. When the association is inconsistent, its 
effects would limit to inter-trial priming, and then vanish as a function of subsequent 
allocations of attention. One form of attentional capture would also be the product of 
a similar lingering of short-term implicit memory on a previously highlighted stimulus 
(Hickey & van Zoest, 2012; Hickey et al., 2015). If the association between visual 
stimulus and outcome is consistent and extended in time, then object-skill can 
develop, with an increase in the saliency, detection and recognition of the stimulus. 
This type of learning, just like its motor counterpart, action-skill, displays high-
capacity and long-term retention (Hikosaka et al. 2013). At the same time, once 
established, associations formed in this way are essentially blind to recent changes in 
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the values of individual objects, showing a lesser degree of flexibility. As a 
consequence, at this stage, these stimuli acquire visual saliency on their own, and can 
easily lead to a second form of attentional capture, when in conflict with the current 
attentional set (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, we know that reward does not only affect behavior on an implicit level, 
but also on an explicit one. Accordingly, the classically conceived, strategic 
endogenous bias is also expected to be modulated by rewarding outcomes, but in this 
case through an increase in attention and motivation. We have seen that many 
studies find, in the rewarded condition, an increase in activation in the fronto-parietal 
regions held responsible for top-down modulation (Roesch and Olson, 2004; 
Engelmann et al., 2009; Leathers & Olson, 2012; Krebs et al., 2012). This network of 
areas allows a conscious, model-based approach to motor planning and perceptual 
selection, which develops more slowly, but is less prone to erroneous generalizations 
and useless perseveration. A similar dissociation between a reflexive, model-based 
controller, mainly based on prefrontal cortex, and a reflective, model-free system, 
centered on basal ganglia, is also theorized by Daw and colleagues at the level of 
action selection and decision making (Daw et al., 2005).  
Crucially, while reward has an analogous, facilitating effect on both the voluntary and 
the automatic type of control, the way in which punishment affects attention could 
differ between and also within systems. In the model-based, strategic top-down 
control, punishment reasonably contributes to the build-up of attention and causes 
an increase in the saliency of the stimulus. We have seen that fronto-parietal regions 
show an increase in activation not only in the case of reward (Krebs et al., 2012), but 
more in general for all motivationally salient outcomes (Roesch & Olson, 2004; 
Engelmann et al., 2009; Leathers & Olson, 2012). We also find this in both our MR 
studies (Chapter 3 and 4), where the salience contrast revealed increased activation in 
fronto-parietal regions (MFG and IPL), parts of the top-down attentional control 
network, indicating that salient categories were in fact recruiting regions of the brain 
involved in the endogenous, strategic deployment of attention. 
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For the automatic endogenous attentional bias, on the other hand, aversive outcomes 
will be instead harder to interpret, maybe because of the more basic computations 
that this system is capable of operating. The dilemma arising during punishment could 
be clarified by analyzing the different role of dopamine in appetitive and aversive 
contexts. Larger rewards determine an increase in dopamine release in a series of 
regions involved in evaluation and motivation, like for example striatum, leading in 
turn to increased vigor during action, and to selection of behaviors bound to reward 
delivery. Larger punishments decrease dopamine release, and this is particularly 
evident in Pavlovian conditioning paradigms, where no action is effective in 
preventing aversive outcome. At the same time, when punishment is avoidable, 
dopamine serves this behavior (Oleson, Gentry, Chioma, & Cheer, 2012). How is the 
contrast between this decrease of dopamine during aversive events and increases 
during avoidance resolved? A computational model by Dayan proposes a solution 
based on an adjusted EV signal (Dayan, 2012). This signal represents the level of 
punishment that is potentially avoidable through action, and consequently drives a 
dopaminergic response. A recent study by Rigoli investigates neural activation during 
a visual search task using this model as a framework for the analysis of imaging data 
(Rigoli, Chew, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016). Coherently, results showed that activity in VS 
and VTA/SN covaried with net EV, while activity in anterior insula, and again in 
VTA/SN, covaried with adjusted EV. This means that, again, the subcortical network 
represented outcomes according to a valence-like pattern and the cortical one 
according to a salience-like one. 
Still, the way in which appetitive and aversive outcomes are represented in the whole 
striatum is not completely clear, although this structure seems to follow a ventro-
dorsal gradient, with motivational valence represented ventrally and motivational 
salience dorsally. As a consequence, the specific attentional network, and the specific 
region of the basal ganglia (in case of a leading role by selection history bias) involved 
in the task could set the corresponding pattern of attentional deployment. Therefore, 
in tasks where the strategic endogenous system is prevalently active, or similarly 
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where regions of the automatic attention network, but characterized by a salience-
like pattern, are leading attention, then punishment will concur with reward in the 
enhancement of representation of salient stimuli (as in Raymond & O’Brien, 2009 (full 
attention condition) and in Engelmann et al., 2009). In instances where other regions 
of the automatic system, displaying in this case a valence-like pattern of activation, 
are instead prevalently active, punishment will fail in prioritizing aversive stimuli, even 
when this shows to be counterproductive for the fitness of the individual, and cause a 
selective suppression of representation (as in Laufer & Paz, 2012). As we have already 
considered in the end of previous section, visual search for high-level categories of 
objects in real-world scenes can be classified as a parallel, efficient type of search, 
probably due to the highly-automatized operations subserving this process. A leading 
role of the involuntary endogenous bias in this type of task would then be consistent 
with the automaticity of these cognitive functions on one side, and with the 
involvement of its putative neural substrates, basal ganglia, in action- and object-skill, 
on the other (Hikosaka, 2013). Indeed, Awh (2012) suggests that contextual cueing, 
which we have seen to be critical in improving efficiency in naturalistic search, could 
be one of the various instances where selection history bias manifests itself. 
Unfortunately, no study addresses the specific issue of the representation of opposing 
motivational outcomes within the context of the CDt, the area which is more relevant 
to our topic. Nevertheless, this region has shown to present quite a series of 
differences with respect to its neighboring caudate areas, such as the CD body and 
head (Hikosaka et al., 2014). It is not trivial therefore to foresee what pattern of 
activation it could display. Interestingly, the CDt shows increased activation in our 
univariate analysis, and more specifically in the valence contrast, supporting a 
corresponding type of modulation by motivational outcomes. A similar bias for 
positive stimuli at the level of CDt can be inferred from a study by Kim and colleagues 
(Figure 3E), although the authors do not focus on this specific aspect of the data (Kim 
et al., 2013). If we consider that CDt presents a valence-like model of activation, and 
similarly beware the leading role of this structure in shaping the automatic 
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deployment of attention, then the apparently paradoxical pattern of our (and of other 
similar studies) behavioral and imaging data could be explained. Another way of 
looking at this phenomenon is that this type of automatic, rapid visual attentional 
deployment is fundamentally shaped by object incentive value, rather than by its 
motivational, strategic or more generally arousal value. 
 
Expect the unexpected 
In chapter 4, we looked at how the same types of feedback affected cortical 
representation of visual stimuli when no consistent pairing was present between 
objects categories and motivational outcomes. Participants had to look for two 
categories at the same time, and for each trial discriminate which of the two targets 
appeared in the briefly presented real-world scene. The type of feedback in this case 
was not following a consistent schedule across trials, such that correct performance 
would have always led to the optimal feedback, but the trial could have been a 
rewarding, a punishing or a neutral one, and subjects discovered the trial type only at 
the end, at the moment of outcome delivery. In this case, we did not have any 
distractor category, but just a “present” and an “absent” category which alternated 
across trials. What we observed in this case was that the appearance of the category 
biased the trialwise activation of ventro-temporal cortex in favour of the multivariate 
representation of the present category, while the representation of the absent one 
was suppressed with respect to baseline, in a way which resembled what happened to 
salient distractors in the previous visual search paradigms. With respect to the 
motivational modulation of information in OSC, we observed a totally specular 
pattern of response across participants which depended on one side on the 
responsivity of SN, and on the other on a personality trait which assessed the 
individual sensitivity to aversive cues. More specifically, the degree to which SN 
displayed a valence-based activation determined the extent to which category 
information in OSC followed the positive valence pattern. On the contrary, the higher 
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the BIS scores of the subjects, the higher the extent to which category information 
followed an inverse valence pattern. These modulations were present in both studies, 
and in both cases reciprocally independent. Nevertheless, while these two opposing 
biases were completely balanced and cancelled each other in the case of an 
inconsistent schedule, a net overall positive bias took over in the case of a consistent 
schedule. Hypotheses trying to account for this discrepancy have been illustrated in 
chapter 4. 
We have already talked about the putative additional control due to prior association 
with reward; in this experiment, we also find hints for a symmetric bias towards stimuli 
associated with loss. Just like the reward-associated control, this bias seems to reflect 
an affective, irrational prioritization: the value of rewarded and punished categories is 
exactly the same, but high trait anxiety individuals tend to prioritize the latter over the 
former. It should be pointed out once again that orienting to motivational stimuli 
according to a salience model would have not necessarily reflected a strategic 
approach to the problem. It could have also resulted from an undifferentiated, 
automatic prioritization of all affectively relevant stimuli, rewarded and punished ones. 
In this case, though, the source of the attentional control would have most probably 
been common for both kinds of affective stimuli with respect to neutral ones. Instead, 
a resuming view from what has been considered throughout this thesis (both in terms 
of the experiments of the project, and of the other studies which have been reviewed), 
suggests that, although a bias towards both types of outcomes appears to be present, it 
does not the share the same origin. Each of these two sources of prioritization displays 
its own relationship with different personality traits, emotional states and task specifics 
(attentional load, time windows available for response, unexpectedness of stimulus 
type). Accordingly, each one of them also presents its own specific neural substrate: 
basal ganglia for the reward-associated selection history bias (Anderson, 2016), and 
amygdala for the emotional control (Vuilleumier, 2005). A similar segregation between 
a positive and a negative evaluative channel has been posited by Cacioppo and 
Gardner in their dissertation about different theories of emotion (Cacioppo & Gardner, 
132 
 
1999). These considerations picture an even more complex situation from the one we 
had foreshadowed before, with four different sources of attention interacting with each 
other independently: the positively and the negatively valenced bias, plus the 
traditional exogenous bias and strategic top-down control. 
Previously in this chapter, we have addressed the relationship between dopamine and 
selection history bias, and the way in which reward and punishment could influence 
dopamine release. In particular, we have considered how complex it could turn out for 
punishment to highjack this system in order to convey signals about the strategic 
utility (or threatening value) of a stimulus, leading to the paradoxical situation of a 
selective suppression of potentially behaviorally relevant stimuli. In the perspective of 
an additional aversive bias, the role of other neurotransmitters, such as for example 
serotonin, should also be taken in consideration. Niv and colleagues developed a 
model which considers the tradeoff between the energetic cost for a particular 
behavior and the opportunity cost of time (the amount of reward lost when this 
behavior is not performed) (Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007). This model assumes that 
tonic levels of dopamine encode this evaluation, which would determine not only the 
selection of the appropriate behavior (as theories of reinforcement learning posit), 
but also the vigor with which this behavior has to be performed. Cools and colleagues 
extended this model, by considering the additional role of serotonin in this tradeoff 
which regulates response vigor (Cools, Nakamura, & Daw, 2011). The authors posit 
that this other neurotransmitter would code for punishment, and that its release 
would mediate punishment-induced inhibition. If we consider again the aversive bias 
and the neural structures which mediate it, it could be interesting to note that acute 
tryptophan depletion (ATD) (a treatment which is used in order to lower the 
concentration of serotonin of the brain) was found to enhance activation of the 
amygdala in response to fearful faces with respect to neutral ones (Cools et al., 2005). 
Moreover, getting back to our considerations with respect to the relationship 
between personality traits and the strength of the emotional bias, the entity of this 
enhancement was found to correlate with BIS scores of participants. 
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Finally, a direct comparison between the univariate analyses of BOLD signal of the 
two MR studies (Chaper 3 and Chapter 4) revealed another interesting finding. In both 
studies, the salience contrast displayed an increase in activation in MFG, IPL and AI, 
consistent with a role for fronto-parietal lobes in providing a model-based, strategic 
evaluation of the outcomes. The valence contrast showed instead an increased 
activation (among other structures) at the level of striatum. Nevertheless, the exact 
location of this increase varied according to the type of reinforcement schedule. 
Response was higher for rewarded stimuli compared to punished stimuli in ventral 
striatum (VS) during an inconsistent schedule, and in caudate tail (CDt) following a 
consistent schedule of reinforcement. This agrees with studies which posit for VS the 
role of the critic (feedback evaluation) and for other parts of striatum the role of the 
actor (storage of specific stimulus-outcome associations). Moreover, it strengthens 
the hypothesis which considers CDt, as part of the visual cortico-striatal loop, as the 
site where this type of implicit learning is stored for visual stimuli.  
In conclusion, this project tried to further characterize a control system which has 
recently been shown to shape attentional deployment in addition to the traditional 
top-down and bottom-up ones, namely the reward-associated selection history bias. 
Our study further supports the involuntary and irrational nature of this new control, 
by highlighting that motivationally salient, but negatively valenced, stimuli, fail to 
activate it, leading to a specific neglect for punishing stimuli. We also find hints for a 
specular, threat-induced, “emotional” bias, which for this type of stimuli appears to be 
strongly dependent on the personality of the subjects. These alternative sources of 
attention represent instances of the many paradoxical ways in which affect can direct 
behavior. These examples range from trivial episodes, like our naivety to smart 
advertisement techniques, to serious issues like addiction, anxiety and depression. It 
is now becoming always clearer how these powerful, seducing, but also potentially 
maladaptive mechanisms, do not only affect the way we act on the world, but also 
the way we perceive it. 
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really matter! 
Then, I want to thank Laura ♍ (third virgo in this space btw… do we have a pattern 
here?) for the time we have spent together, chats, drinks, and milk with mint in the 
middle of the night! What is Locos when you can be in Barattieri Road? At least just 
until ‘i ne tacan! And thanks for the best ringtone ever, I am still thinking of switching 
back to my old mobile for that! 
Laura ♌, the start of this path decreed the end of our physical closeness, but, in spite 
of that (or maybe because of that? ;) ), you encouraged me to follow it and I appreciate 
it. Moreover, in spite of the distance, whenever we meet again it just takes a few 
minutes to feel just as if I had left yesterday. Thank you for being there. 
Alessio, they say that light from the stars takes years to arrive to the ground. 
Sometimes even words do. So finally here are the lines which go out to my longest and 
farthest journey. I want to thank you for your empathy, your patience and your 
wisdom. I still treasure all of them just as then. 
I also want to thank Irene ♉2 (and it could have been nothing but squared!), Irene ♌, 
Maria Carmela and Andrea. Each one of you has or had his own, very special place in 
my life. Thanks. 
Last and of course not least, I want to thank my big and happy family. I mean all of it, 
from Archons Street, to Pelican Road (cats included? Mmm… don’t know!), Lieutenant 
Panella Street, Very Religious the XIth Road, and Aurelia Valley Square! Jokes aside, I 
cannot say anything but how blessed I feel to have all of you close, although far. 
Thanks. 
 
